In U.S. v. Lindsey, No. 05-11273 (March 27, 2007), the Court (2-1, Barkett, J., dissenting), the court affirmed the conviction and 300-month sentence of a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of one or more rounds of ammunition.
The Court affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress, finding that there was sufficient reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior to justify the defendant’s detention. The police received a tip from a person who identified himself as "Davis" reporting that four black males were loading guns and putting them in a large white SUV parked at a gas station across from a bank. The police had been investigating a series of armed bank robberies by three or four blacks who entered banks with assault weapons and drove SUV-type vehicles. The police went to the scene and saw a white Ford SUV parked behind the gas station, with four black occupants, which moved when a police vehicle came into view. The police shouted to the individuals to get on the ground. Police converged. The defendant was arrested.
The Court distinguished Florida v. J.L., 120 S.Ct. 1375 (2000), finding that the police here had more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion based on an anonymous tip. The tip was consistent with an ongoing investigation. Further, the movement of the SUV when the police vehicle came into view gave rise to further suspicion.
The Court further found that probably cause supported the defendant’s subsequent arrest. After the police had detained the four occupants of the SUV, an armored car pulled up to the bank, and guards loaded money into it. The four men were convicted felons. Peering through the tinted windows the SUV, police saw what they believed was a rifle bag.
The Court further rejected defendant’s challenge to the search of the vehicle, noting the applicability of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
The Court found no Brady violation in the destruction of a fingerprint card which, the police claimed, contained no valuable information.
Finally, the Court affirmed the district court’s admission of uncharged criminal activity, namely defendant’s plan to rob a bank, at trial. This evidence was "inextricably intertwined" with the charged conduct.
Finally, the Court found no error in the 300-months sentence reliance on uncharged criminal activity, or on prior convictions.
Tuesday, March 27, 2007
Monday, March 26, 2007
Jimenez: Court denies certificate of appealability
In Jimenez v. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 06-14523 (March 23, 2007), the Court denied a certificate of appealability to a Florida death row inmate who claimed that the Florida Supreme Court failed to apply retroactively a defense-favorable burglary precedent to him.
The Court noted that Jimenez failed to exhaust his retroactivity claim in the Florida courts, and that he was now barred from doing so in federal court, because his claim would now be procedurally defaulted in Florida state courts, and he had not shown "cause" for the default. Even if his claim were not defaulted, the Court found no constitutional error in the Florida courts’ refusal to apply a precedent retroactively to Jimenez.
The Court found Jimenez’ remaining claims to be procedurally barred, or failed to assert a claim worthy of a certificate of appealability.
The Court noted that Jimenez failed to exhaust his retroactivity claim in the Florida courts, and that he was now barred from doing so in federal court, because his claim would now be procedurally defaulted in Florida state courts, and he had not shown "cause" for the default. Even if his claim were not defaulted, the Court found no constitutional error in the Florida courts’ refusal to apply a precedent retroactively to Jimenez.
The Court found Jimenez’ remaining claims to be procedurally barred, or failed to assert a claim worthy of a certificate of appealability.
Wednesday, March 21, 2007
Smith: Mere Possession = In Connection
In U.S. v. Smith, No. 06-14077 (March 19, 2007), the Court affirmed the 294-month sentence of a defendant convicted of possession of ammunition by a convicted felon.
Smith, a convicted felon, was stopped in an automobile and seen attempting to conceal a firearm and cocaine. He fled on foot. When arrested, one .38 caliber bullet was found in his pocket, another on the ground where he had thrown it. The sentencing court imposed a sentence enhancement based on the guideline provision which calls for enhancements when ammunition is possessed "in connection with" a drug felony or another felony offense. Smith challenged the enhancement on the ground that the ammunition was not possessed "in connection with" another felony. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that "mere possession" of the ammunition sufficed to make it "in connection with" another felony.
The Court also rejected the argument that the sentencing court erroneously treated the Guidelines as mandatory, noting the Court’s reference to the "advisory range."
Smith, a convicted felon, was stopped in an automobile and seen attempting to conceal a firearm and cocaine. He fled on foot. When arrested, one .38 caliber bullet was found in his pocket, another on the ground where he had thrown it. The sentencing court imposed a sentence enhancement based on the guideline provision which calls for enhancements when ammunition is possessed "in connection with" a drug felony or another felony offense. Smith challenged the enhancement on the ground that the ammunition was not possessed "in connection with" another felony. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that "mere possession" of the ammunition sufficed to make it "in connection with" another felony.
The Court also rejected the argument that the sentencing court erroneously treated the Guidelines as mandatory, noting the Court’s reference to the "advisory range."
Friday, March 16, 2007
Thompson: Counsel did not adequately consult regarding appeal
In Thompson v. U.S., No. 05-16970 (Mar. 14, 2007), the Court (Tjoflat, Barkett & Kravitch) reversed the denial of a § 2255 motion.
The defendant claimed that his counsel was ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal. The Court affirmed the district court’s finding that the defendant had not instructed his lawyer to file a notice of appeal. However, the Court found that counsel had not adequately discussed the appeal with his client. Counsel had told the defendant an appeal of his sentence would not be worthwhile, in a five-minute exchange. The Court found that this was not adequate "consultation." Moreover, the defendant was "unhappy" with the sentence he received. This demonstrated a reasonable probability that, had the defendant been adequately consulted, he would have requested an appeal. Hence, counsel was ineffective.
The defendant claimed that his counsel was ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal. The Court affirmed the district court’s finding that the defendant had not instructed his lawyer to file a notice of appeal. However, the Court found that counsel had not adequately discussed the appeal with his client. Counsel had told the defendant an appeal of his sentence would not be worthwhile, in a five-minute exchange. The Court found that this was not adequate "consultation." Moreover, the defendant was "unhappy" with the sentence he received. This demonstrated a reasonable probability that, had the defendant been adequately consulted, he would have requested an appeal. Hence, counsel was ineffective.
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Dingle: No experts on cause of death not ineffective assistance
In Dingle v. Sec. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 05-13408 (March 8, 2007), the Court held that counsel was not ineffective for not calling any expert witnesses regarding the cause of the victim-baby’s death at a second trial, when, at the defendant’s first trial, counsel had called expert witnesses and this first trial ended with a guilty verdict.
The Court found that the tactical decision not to call expert witnesses was meant to focus on the issue of intent rather the issue of causation, and avoiding drawing attention of the brutality of the baby’s injuries.
The Court found that the tactical decision not to call expert witnesses was meant to focus on the issue of intent rather the issue of causation, and avoiding drawing attention of the brutality of the baby’s injuries.
Tuesday, March 06, 2007
Gilliam: No Brady violation for death row inmate
In Gilliam v. Sec. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 05-16638 (March 6, 2007), the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief to a Florida inmate sentenced to death for a 1982 murder.
The Court rejected the argument that the Florida state court erred in not finding a Brady violation in the State’s failure to disclose a police report that indicated that the victim was a prostitute. The Court found that this evidence would not have changed the evaluation of whether the defendant lacked the mental state to commit the murder.
The Court also rejected an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his counsel’s opening the door to the defendant’s prior rape conviction. The Court declined to resolve whether this was deficient performance, finding that in any event it did not sufficiently compromise the defense.
The Court finally found nothing unreasonable in the Florida courts’ rejection of the argument that counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase, noting, for example, that counsel could "focus on few points in closing" or even forego a closing argument altogether – and counsel did argue that life imprisonment would suffice as punishment, an argument the jury and the sentencing judge did not adopt.
The Court rejected the argument that the Florida state court erred in not finding a Brady violation in the State’s failure to disclose a police report that indicated that the victim was a prostitute. The Court found that this evidence would not have changed the evaluation of whether the defendant lacked the mental state to commit the murder.
The Court also rejected an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his counsel’s opening the door to the defendant’s prior rape conviction. The Court declined to resolve whether this was deficient performance, finding that in any event it did not sufficiently compromise the defense.
The Court finally found nothing unreasonable in the Florida courts’ rejection of the argument that counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase, noting, for example, that counsel could "focus on few points in closing" or even forego a closing argument altogether – and counsel did argue that life imprisonment would suffice as punishment, an argument the jury and the sentencing judge did not adopt.
Gilliam: no Brady violation for death row inmate
In Gilliam v. Sec. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 05-16638 (March 6, 2007), the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief to a Florida inmate sentenced to death for a 1982 murder.
The Court rejected the argument that the Florida state court erred in not finding a Brady violation in the State’s failure to disclose a police report that indicated that the victim was a prostitute. The Court found that this evidence would not have changed the evaluation of whether the defendant lacked the mental state to commit the murder.
The Court also rejected an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his counsel’s opening the door to the defendant’s prior rape conviction. The Court declined to resolve whether this was deficient performance, finding that in any event it did not sufficiently compromise the defense.
The Court finally found nothing unreasonable in the Florida courts’ rejection of the argument that counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase, noting, for example, that counsel could "focus on few points in closing" or even forego a closing argument altogether – and counsel did argue that life imprisonment would suffice as punishment, an argument the jury and the sentencing judge did not adopt.
The Court rejected the argument that the Florida state court erred in not finding a Brady violation in the State’s failure to disclose a police report that indicated that the victim was a prostitute. The Court found that this evidence would not have changed the evaluation of whether the defendant lacked the mental state to commit the murder.
The Court also rejected an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his counsel’s opening the door to the defendant’s prior rape conviction. The Court declined to resolve whether this was deficient performance, finding that in any event it did not sufficiently compromise the defense.
The Court finally found nothing unreasonable in the Florida courts’ rejection of the argument that counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase, noting, for example, that counsel could "focus on few points in closing" or even forego a closing argument altogether – and counsel did argue that life imprisonment would suffice as punishment, an argument the jury and the sentencing judge did not adopt.
Taylor: Fictional robbery can violate Hobbs Act
In U.S. v. Taylor, No. 05-14652 (March 6, 2007), the Court held that a Hobbs Act conspiracy by means of robbery can be established even though the object of the planned robbery, cocaine, did not exist, because the robbery was a sting set up by government agents and confidential informants.
The Court held that the fact that the intended victims and narcotics were fictional was irrelevant to whether the Hobbs Act was violated. The interstate nexus was sufficient to establish a violation.
The Court held that the fact that the intended victims and narcotics were fictional was irrelevant to whether the Hobbs Act was violated. The interstate nexus was sufficient to establish a violation.
Monday, March 05, 2007
Gordon: Lawrence resolves habeas untimeliness
In Gordon v. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 06-15783 (March 1, 2007), the Court affirmed the denial of a federal habeas petition on grounds that it was untimely under the AEDPA.
The petitioner had relied "on the hope, now forsaken, that the Supreme Court in reviewing [the Eleventh Circuit’s] Lawrence [v. Florida] decision would provide him with some basis for relief." That hope was forsaken because the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding. Consequently, the petitioner lost on all his arguments. The statute of limitations is not equitably tolled when the failure to file on time is the fault of capital case counsel specially appointed and supervised by Florida courts. Further, the statute of limitations is not tolled during the time a petition for certiorari is pending before the U.S. Supreme Court in state collateral proceedings. The failure of his court-appointed counsel to file more promptly did not constitute an impediment to filing by State action.
The petitioner had relied "on the hope, now forsaken, that the Supreme Court in reviewing [the Eleventh Circuit’s] Lawrence [v. Florida] decision would provide him with some basis for relief." That hope was forsaken because the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding. Consequently, the petitioner lost on all his arguments. The statute of limitations is not equitably tolled when the failure to file on time is the fault of capital case counsel specially appointed and supervised by Florida courts. Further, the statute of limitations is not tolled during the time a petition for certiorari is pending before the U.S. Supreme Court in state collateral proceedings. The failure of his court-appointed counsel to file more promptly did not constitute an impediment to filing by State action.
Wednesday, February 28, 2007
Perez-Oliveros: Importation is continuous until destination reached
In U.S. v. Perez-Oliveros, No. 06-12757 (Feb. 22, 2007), the Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of a defendant convicted of methamphetamine trafficking.
The Court affirmed the sentence enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(4), which calls for a two-level increase if the offense involved the importation of methamphetamine. The Court noted that from the fact of Perez’ truck having crossed the Mexican border 14 hours prior to Perez’ arrest, the sentencing court could infer that the methamphetamine was in Perez’ truck when it crossed the border. The Court also rejected the argument that no evidence showed Perez was in the truck when it crossed the border. The Court pointed out that the enhancement applies if the offense "involved" importation. The Court also rejected the argument that the importation had ended by the time Perez began driving the truck. The Court noted that importation is a continuous crime that is not complete until the controlled substance reaches its final destination point, which in this case was Mobile, Alabama, where Perez was destined.
The Court affirmed the sentence enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(4), which calls for a two-level increase if the offense involved the importation of methamphetamine. The Court noted that from the fact of Perez’ truck having crossed the Mexican border 14 hours prior to Perez’ arrest, the sentencing court could infer that the methamphetamine was in Perez’ truck when it crossed the border. The Court also rejected the argument that no evidence showed Perez was in the truck when it crossed the border. The Court pointed out that the enhancement applies if the offense "involved" importation. The Court also rejected the argument that the importation had ended by the time Perez began driving the truck. The Court noted that importation is a continuous crime that is not complete until the controlled substance reaches its final destination point, which in this case was Mobile, Alabama, where Perez was destined.
Yost: Attempt means beginning to make arrangements
In U.S. v. Yost, No. 06-10911 (Feb. 26, 2007), the Court affirmed the conviction of a defendant convicted of attempt to use the Internet to entice a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), rejected Yost’s arguments that the evidence was insufficient to convict.
The Court found that Yost satisfied the intent element of the attempt offense when he initiated contact with two (undercover agents posing as) underage girls, was told they were under-age, and repeatedly ask them to engage in oral sex.
The Court further found that Yost satisfied the "substantial step" element of the offense when he engaged in conduct which strongly corroborates the required culpability. Here, even though Yost never arrived at the agreed meeting place, he "crossed the line" when he made arrangements to meet, and took steps enticing the minors to engage in criminal sexual activity.
The Court found that Yost satisfied the intent element of the attempt offense when he initiated contact with two (undercover agents posing as) underage girls, was told they were under-age, and repeatedly ask them to engage in oral sex.
The Court further found that Yost satisfied the "substantial step" element of the offense when he engaged in conduct which strongly corroborates the required culpability. Here, even though Yost never arrived at the agreed meeting place, he "crossed the line" when he made arrangements to meet, and took steps enticing the minors to engage in criminal sexual activity.
Wednesday, February 21, 2007
Patrick: Loss amount wrong
In U.S. v. Patrick, No. 05-17111 (Feb. 20, 2007), the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant convicted of embezzlement.
The district court based its sentence on the estimated loss of $1.4 million, a number based on the tax liability of the victim of Patrick’s embezzlement – but a liability "unconnected to Patrick in any way." Further, the loss amount included amounts that, as the government conceded, should not have been included. The judgment was therefore vacated and reversed.
The district court based its sentence on the estimated loss of $1.4 million, a number based on the tax liability of the victim of Patrick’s embezzlement – but a liability "unconnected to Patrick in any way." Further, the loss amount included amounts that, as the government conceded, should not have been included. The judgment was therefore vacated and reversed.
Evans: Anthrax hoax not serious violent felony
In U.S. v. Evans, No. 05-14498 (Feb. 16, 2007), the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part a sentence imposed on a defendant who, while a state inmate serving a 100-year sentence, committed an anthrax hoax by mailing a letter with a harmless powder substance to the Pensacola federal courthouse.
The Court found no plain error in the acceptance of a guilty plea for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332a and 876(c), which criminalize threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction, and threatening to injury by mail. Evans claimed that these statute involved only threats of a future act, as opposed to an immediate threat. The Court sided with three Circuits to have considered this issue, and held that the statutes did not required threats of a future act. For this reason, the guilty plea was valid.
The Court agreed with Evans, however, that his anthrax hoax did not qualify as a "serious violent felony" for purposes of triggering the mandatory life sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 35599c)(2)(F). The government claimed that the arterial blood draws which medical personnel may perform on potentially exposed persons, as well as the physical force used in evacuating a building both provided the element of physical force necessary for a serious violent felony. The Court rejected this argument as over-broad, transforming virtually any crime into a serious violent felony, as there always some risk that police will use force during arrest. Moreover, the new statute criminalizing anthrax hoaxes establishes a maximum 5 year punishment, below the 10-year threshold for "serious violent felonies" – further confirming that this crime should not qualify.
The Court found no plain error in the acceptance of a guilty plea for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332a and 876(c), which criminalize threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction, and threatening to injury by mail. Evans claimed that these statute involved only threats of a future act, as opposed to an immediate threat. The Court sided with three Circuits to have considered this issue, and held that the statutes did not required threats of a future act. For this reason, the guilty plea was valid.
The Court agreed with Evans, however, that his anthrax hoax did not qualify as a "serious violent felony" for purposes of triggering the mandatory life sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 35599c)(2)(F). The government claimed that the arterial blood draws which medical personnel may perform on potentially exposed persons, as well as the physical force used in evacuating a building both provided the element of physical force necessary for a serious violent felony. The Court rejected this argument as over-broad, transforming virtually any crime into a serious violent felony, as there always some risk that police will use force during arrest. Moreover, the new statute criminalizing anthrax hoaxes establishes a maximum 5 year punishment, below the 10-year threshold for "serious violent felonies" – further confirming that this crime should not qualify.
Koblan: Death moots appeal
In U.S. v. Koblan, No. 05-13038 (Feb. 16, 2007), the Court reaffirmed the rule that, when a criminal defendant dies while an appeal is still pending, the appeal must be dismissed as moot, and the judgment must be vacated by the district court. The Court held that this rule applied even when, as here, the judgment included a sizeable restitution order in favor of the defendant’s victims. The Court noted that the victims could still bring a civil suit against the defendant’s estate. The Court recognized a circuit split on this issue.
Wednesday, February 14, 2007
Madison: Enhancement for sentence for Pimp's use of force to keep prostitute in employ
In U.S. v. Madison, No. 06-11914 (Feb. 12, 2007), the Court affirmed the use, by cross-reference, of a criminal sex abuse sentence enhancement under USSG § 2A3.1, for a defendant who pled guilty to sex trafficking by force.
The defendant argued that the sentence enhancement applied in cases of forcible rape, not for using violence (as he did) to keep a prostitute in his employ.
The Court recognized that because the Guideline provision was amended in 2004, its prior caselaw was not applicable. However, under the current law, the application of the cross-reference was correct. The use of fear and violence to keep a person in one’s employ to commit sex acts qualified as the use of force, and therefore qualified for the cross-reference enhancement.
The defendant argued that the sentence enhancement applied in cases of forcible rape, not for using violence (as he did) to keep a prostitute in his employ.
The Court recognized that because the Guideline provision was amended in 2004, its prior caselaw was not applicable. However, under the current law, the application of the cross-reference was correct. The use of fear and violence to keep a person in one’s employ to commit sex acts qualified as the use of force, and therefore qualified for the cross-reference enhancement.
Watkins: Solicitation Sentence reduction can be fact-intensive
In U.S. v. Watkins, No. 05-15444 (Feb. 8, 2007) (Carnes, Marcus, Kravitch), the Court held that USSG § 2X1.1(b), which provides for a three-level decrease in the base offense level for solicitation offenses, does not apply when the circumstances demonstrate to the defendant that the person solicited was about to complete the substantive offense.
Watkins solicited a person to commit arson. Unbeknownst to him, the person was an undercover police agent. At sentencing, the district court declined to reduce the sentence pursuant to § 2X1.1(b) for solicitation, because, from Watkins’ perspective, everything was done to successfully complete the arson.
Reversing, the Court held that the relevant test was whether the person solicited had taken all the crucial steps necessary to demonstrate to the defendant that the offense was about to be completed. Here, more fact-finding was necessary to determine whether the undercover agent’s actions made it clear to Watkins that the agent was about to complete the offense. The Court therefore remanded for resentencing, noting that post-Booker, the district court was not bound by the attempt guideline.
Watkins solicited a person to commit arson. Unbeknownst to him, the person was an undercover police agent. At sentencing, the district court declined to reduce the sentence pursuant to § 2X1.1(b) for solicitation, because, from Watkins’ perspective, everything was done to successfully complete the arson.
Reversing, the Court held that the relevant test was whether the person solicited had taken all the crucial steps necessary to demonstrate to the defendant that the offense was about to be completed. Here, more fact-finding was necessary to determine whether the undercover agent’s actions made it clear to Watkins that the agent was about to complete the offense. The Court therefore remanded for resentencing, noting that post-Booker, the district court was not bound by the attempt guideline.
Tuesday, February 06, 2007
Malol: Enhancement for Violating Order Requires Final Agency Action
In U.S. v. Malol, No. 05-10688 (Feb. 2, 2007), the Court affirmed part of the sentence and vacated part of it, for a defendant convicted of frauds arising out of his practice of increasing the moving costs for customers after giving them a lower initial estimate.
The Court rejected the argument that the prosecution improperly used a summary chart in evidence. The Court found that even if the summary chart was improperly admitted, any error was harmless because of the overwhelming victim testimony of the defendant’s practice of inflating moving costs.
The Court also rejected the challenge to the over $1 million loss calculation. The jury found that the fraud amount exceeded $1 million, beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court could therefore find that this amount was exceeded, by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Court, however, reversed the sentence enhancement based on the commission of a fraud in violation of an order, pursuant to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(7). The Court noted that the administrative body in question, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, never held a hearing regarding Malol’s conduct, and never adjudicated his conduct; it merely sent out a notice that Malol’s conduct might be illegal. It was therefore improper to impose a sentence enhancement because there was no final agency action.
The Court rejected the argument that the prosecution improperly used a summary chart in evidence. The Court found that even if the summary chart was improperly admitted, any error was harmless because of the overwhelming victim testimony of the defendant’s practice of inflating moving costs.
The Court also rejected the challenge to the over $1 million loss calculation. The jury found that the fraud amount exceeded $1 million, beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court could therefore find that this amount was exceeded, by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Court, however, reversed the sentence enhancement based on the commission of a fraud in violation of an order, pursuant to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(7). The Court noted that the administrative body in question, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, never held a hearing regarding Malol’s conduct, and never adjudicated his conduct; it merely sent out a notice that Malol’s conduct might be illegal. It was therefore improper to impose a sentence enhancement because there was no final agency action.
Stewart: No Deficient Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence
In Stewart v. Sec’t, Dept. of Corrections, No. 06-11684 (Jan. 31, 2007), the Court affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief to a Florida death row inmate convicted of a 1985 murder.
The Court rejected the argument that counsel was ineffective in failing to put on sufficient mitigating evidence regarding the abuse Stewart suffered during his upbringing. The Court found that counsel supplied the mental health expert with ample evidence, and that Stewart withheld other evidence from trial counsel. The Court also noted the mental health expert’s testimony at a state post-conviction hearing that the new evidence "wouldn’t have made any difference" in his final opinion.
The Court also found no deficient performance in the defense’s failure to present evidence of substance and alcohol abuse by the defendant, noting that this would have weakened the argument that tragic family circumstances set in motion Stewart’s violent behavior.
The Court rejected the argument that counsel was ineffective in failing to put on sufficient mitigating evidence regarding the abuse Stewart suffered during his upbringing. The Court found that counsel supplied the mental health expert with ample evidence, and that Stewart withheld other evidence from trial counsel. The Court also noted the mental health expert’s testimony at a state post-conviction hearing that the new evidence "wouldn’t have made any difference" in his final opinion.
The Court also found no deficient performance in the defense’s failure to present evidence of substance and alcohol abuse by the defendant, noting that this would have weakened the argument that tragic family circumstances set in motion Stewart’s violent behavior.
Friday, February 02, 2007
Spottsville: Equitable Tolling for Misled Habeas Petitioner
In Spottsville v. Terry, No. 05-12656 (Feb. 1, 2007), the Court held that a habeas petitioner had been misled by a written order of a court as to his filing deadline and was therefore entitled to equitable tolling of his habeas petition.
While incarcerated in Georgia and seeking post-conviction relief, Spottsville was given incorrect instructions by a state court as to where to file a petition seeking appellate relief. As a result, his petition was dismissed in the Georgia courts. Further, once Spottsville filed for federal habeas relief, the time period for filing the petition had lapsed, because his case was not "properly filed" in Georgia courts during the relevant time period.
The Court held that although Spottsville’s federal habeas petition was time-barred under the AEDPA, the doctrine of "equitable tolling" applied, because the untimeliness of the federal habeas petition was due to the misleading order the Georgia state court. The Court therefore reversed the dismissal of the petition.
While incarcerated in Georgia and seeking post-conviction relief, Spottsville was given incorrect instructions by a state court as to where to file a petition seeking appellate relief. As a result, his petition was dismissed in the Georgia courts. Further, once Spottsville filed for federal habeas relief, the time period for filing the petition had lapsed, because his case was not "properly filed" in Georgia courts during the relevant time period.
The Court held that although Spottsville’s federal habeas petition was time-barred under the AEDPA, the doctrine of "equitable tolling" applied, because the untimeliness of the federal habeas petition was due to the misleading order the Georgia state court. The Court therefore reversed the dismissal of the petition.
Ramirez: Consensual Encounter, not an Illegal Detention
In U.S. v. Ramirez, No. 05-12765 (Feb. 1, 2007), the Court affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress, holding that the police did not detain Ramirez in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
Ramirez was pulled over for a traffic infraction. After police had determined that he had no outstanding warrants, and after they had issued him a citation and handed him back his papers, a police officer asked Ramirez if he was carrying anything illegal in the car. Ramirez consented to a search of his car, in which 7 kilos of cocaine were found.
Rejecting the argument that the police officer’s question constituted an unreasonable detention, the Court held that at this point the traffic stop had converted into a "consensual encounter." A reasonable person would have felt free to leave and to decline the request for more information.
Ramirez was pulled over for a traffic infraction. After police had determined that he had no outstanding warrants, and after they had issued him a citation and handed him back his papers, a police officer asked Ramirez if he was carrying anything illegal in the car. Ramirez consented to a search of his car, in which 7 kilos of cocaine were found.
Rejecting the argument that the police officer’s question constituted an unreasonable detention, the Court held that at this point the traffic stop had converted into a "consensual encounter." A reasonable person would have felt free to leave and to decline the request for more information.
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