Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals - Published Opinions
Friday, August 28, 2015
In Zelaya v. Sec., Fla. Dept. of Corrections, No. 12-16462 (Aug. 24, 2015), the Court held that a district court committed no error in deciding not to recharacterize Zelaya’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as a § 2255 motion. The Court noted that Zelaya made a strategic choice to file a petition under § 2241, and the district court was not obliged to consider the costs and benefits of the alternative approach. The Court ruled that Zelaya’s § 2241 petition was not cognizable under the savings clause of § 2255(e) because his claim, namely that his illegal reentry conviction was pursuant to an unlawful deportation order, was never foreclosed by Circuit precedent. Zelaya’s claim that he was actually innocent did not entitle him to proceed under § 2241 instead of § 2255. The Court remanded the case to the district court, with instructions to dismiss his petition without prejudice.
Thursday, August 27, 2015
In U.S. v. Feaster, No. 14-13978 (Aug. 25, 2015), the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that her convictions for theft under 18 U.S.C. § 641 should have been misdemeanors, not felonies. The Court noted that under the statute, a punishment of less than one year only applies if the aggregate amount of all counts of conviction did not exceed $1,000. The fact that one count of conviction was for less than $1,000 does not entitled a defendant to have a conviction become a misdemeanor. The Court also rejected Feaster’s challenge to the “sophisticated means” sentence enhancement. The Court noted the totality of the scheme, including the two years for which the conduct was not detected. Feaster used her inside information and her position at the Veterans Administration to perpetrate the fraud. She prepared a fraudulent purchase order to obtain approval to use a government authorized Purchase Card. She obscured her personal purchases by using the Purchase Card. She made fictitious entries in the VA’s system to reconcile the original purchase order with the amount of money she had charged on the Purchase Card.
In U.S. v. Hill, No. 14-12294 (Aug. 26, 2015), the Court, affirming a conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), found no error in a district court’s denial of a defendant’s request to add the word “knowingly” to its jury instruction on “constructive possession.” The Court found that the district court’s instruction impliedly required that Hill knowingly possess the firearm. On a cross-appeal by the government of the district court’s finding that two prior convictions did not qualify as “violent felonies” under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), the Court agreed with Hill that this argument was foreclosed in light of the Supreme Court’s recent Johnson decision. However, the Court (sua sponte: the government did not raise this point on cross-appeal) found that one prior conviction, for resisting an officer with violence, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 843.01, qualified under ACCA’s elements clause. The Court therefore remanded the case for the district court to consider whether the prior Fla. Stat. § 843.01 conviction, coupled with two prior drug offenses, might qualify Hill for a sentence under ACCA.
Friday, August 21, 2015
In U.S. v. Maiello, No. 15-10532 (Aug. 19, 2015), the Court held that a drug offender subject to an Amendment 782 sentence reduction was not eligible to immediately benefit from the reduction because of the Sentencing Commission’s decision to delay any release until November 2015. The Court rejected the argument that the Sentencing Commission improperly considered offenders’ rehabilitation in its delay decision, in violation of Tapia v. U.S. The Court noted that Tapia applied to a decision to impose a sentence, not to a decision to reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). The Court also rejected the argument that the Commission’s delay decision violated the Administrative Procedure Act, pointing out that policy statements of the Commission are not subject to the APA. The Court also found that the Commission’s decision was reasonable, not arbitrary and capricious. Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the Commission’s delay decision encroached on the judicial power. The Court noted that Congress delegated to the Sentencing Commission the power to specify the circumstances under which sentences may be reduced.
Tuesday, August 18, 2015
In U.S. v. Sperrazza, No. 14-11972 (Aug. 17, 2015), the Court affirmed convictions of tax evasion and structuring currency transactions, and a forfeiture order of $870,238.99 on a Georgia physician. The Court (2-1) rejected the argument that a “structuring” violation must involve a defendant who has more than $10,000 on hand (a “cash hoard”). The Court explained that a person who has $9,000 on hand, and knows more cash is on the way, and deposits the $9,000 to evade the $10,000 reporting requirement can be guilty of “structuring.” The Court also rejected Sperrazza’s claim that the $870,238.99 forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Court noted that under the statute the defendant was subject to a fine of up to $500,000. The Court also rejected the argument that the forfeiture was excessive because Sperrazza earned the money lawfully. The Court pointed out that the structuring “decreased the likelihood the IRS would detect the underlying tax evasion.”
Tuesday, August 04, 2015
In U.S. v. Willner, No. 12-15322 (Aug. 3, 2015), the Court reversed a medicare fraud conspiracy conviction for insufficient evidence, but otherwise affirmed convictions arising out of a scheme that submitted in excess of $200 million in fraudulent claims. As to one convicted co-conspirator, the Court noted the absence of any direct evidence of her participation in the conspiracy, and rejected as too weak the inferences the government attempted to draw from circumstantial evidence. The Court rejected other defendants’ argument that they should have been a theory-of-defense instruction based on Florida law, finding that this law did not have influenced the jury based on the way the government presented its case. Joining the majority of circuits to have considered the issue, the Court held that it was proper to give a jury a deliberate ignorance instruction with regard to whether a defendant knew the unlawful purpose of a conspiracy, without giving this instruction to whether the defendant willfully joined in the conspiracy. The Court found that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed a government witness to give opinion testimony, and when it not allowing the defense to cross-examine this witness about the basis for his opinions. However, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.