Santiago: Florida probation and adjudication withheld is a "conviction"

In U.S. v. Santiago, No. 09-10466 (April 2, 2010), the Court held that a guilty plea followed by a sentence of probation and a withholding of adjudication under Florida law qualified as a prior “conviction” for purposes of enhancing an offender’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Rejecting the defendant’s interpretation of the statute, the Court noted that the determination whether a prior judgment should be treated as a “conviction” was a matter of State law. Here, Florida’s habitual offender law expressly provided that a sentence of probation without an adjudication of guilty “shall be treated as a prior conviction.” Thus, Santiago’s prior judgment, along with two other prior convictions, qualified him for the enhanced sentence.

Suarez: Alien Smuggling Convictions Affirmed

In U.S. v. Suarez, No. 08-13675 (March 31, 2010), the Court affirmed alien smuggling convictions and sentences.

The Court rejected the argument that the indictment should be dismissed because the government repatriated to Cuba the group of Cubans on the boat being smuggled to the United States – Cubans who would have testified that they forced their way onto a boat destined only for relatives of the defendant. The Court noted that the defendant never raised this defense during interviews with the Coast Guard, and was otherwise potentially able to present it at trial. Further, the government did not repatriate the Cubans in bad faith, but in accordance with “standard operating procedure.”

The Court also rejected the argument that the application for electronic surveillance was invalid because other investigative procedures were not adequately tried, as the statute requires. The Court cited evidence physical surveillance was used, and testimony that “pen registers and trap and trace devices were not entirely useful because of the probability of multiple subscribers to the previously identified phone numbers and the frequent use of aliases.”

The Court also rejected the argument that the government failed to minimize the interception of communications not subject to wiretap. The Court found that the small number of “minimized” calls was not evidence, standing alone, of unreasonable minimization procedures.

The Court rejected the argument that the defendant should have been able to introduce in evidence a government witness’ prior inconsistent statement made to law enforcement agent. The Court noted that the witness, when questioned about the statement, did not adopt it. Further, it was not admitted as an admission of the declarant’s state of mind, because the witness was not the declarant of the statement, and the statement was made after, not during, the incident.

The Court found that a prosecutor’s vouching for a witness in closing argument did not prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights, pointing out that the judge instructed the jury on how to evaluate witness credibility.

Turning to sentencing, the Court affirmed the imposition of a “special skills” sentence enhancement under USSG § 3B1.3. The Court found that “the average person could not operate a vessel . . . without the use of [the defendant’s] unique skills.” The Court also affirmed the enhancement for causing a substantial risk of death, because 36 individuals were on board a vessel designed to hold no more than 12, and no life jackets were available. It found no double counting occurred as a result of the additional enhancement for endangerment during flight, which was based on a two-hour high-speed chase.

Finally, the Court rejected the argument that a five-year statutory maximum applied to his offense, pointing out that convictions under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I) carry a ten-year maximum.

Sneed: Precluding Police Reports as Source for 924(e) Temporality Findings

In U.S. v. Sneed, No. 09-13195 (March 24, 2010), the Court vacated the 15-year minimum mandatory sentence imposed, based on his three prior convictions, on a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

Section 924(e) provides for a sentence enhancement if the defendant committed three prior qualifying felonies on occasions different from one another. The district court, over Sneed’s objection, found that the three prior felonies were committed on different occasions – based only on police reports.

On appeal, the Court recognized that U.S. v. Richardson, 230 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2000), held that a sentencing court could consider police reports for purposes of determining whether three prior qualifying felonies were committed on occasions different from one another. The Court determined that Richardson had effectively been abrogated by Shephard v. U.S., 544 U.S. 13 (2005).

The Court noted that Shephard precluded reliance on police reports to establish the nature of a prior conviction for purposes of the § 924(e) enhancement. The Court recognized that Shepard thus addressed the nature of prior convictions, not, as in Richardson, whether the prior convictions were temporally separate. However, noting Shephard’s Sixth Amendment concerns, the Court found “simply no distinction” between the two inquiries. It held that police reports are not Shephard-approved sources for § 924(e) findings with respect to whether offenses were committed on different occasions.

The Court vacated Sneed’s sentence and remanded for resentencing without the § 924(e) enhancement.

Ramunno: No Constructive Trust for Victim of Ponzi Scheme

In U.S. v. Ramunno, No. 09-10446 (March 17, 2010), the Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of a fraud-victim’s request to amend an order of forfeiture against the defendant and recognize a “constructive trust” under Georgia state law in the amount of funds the victim invested. The Court pointed out that the claimant was just one of a number of victims of Ramunno’s Ponzi scheme, and that if he were granted a constructive trust to recoup his entire loss, the pool of funds available to distribute to Ramunno’s other victims through the Attorney General’s remission process would be reduced. “If the funds are distributed equitably to all victims, then each victim . . . may recover some fraction of their lost investments.”

Jennings: Workers' Comp. Fraud Conviction Upheld

In U.S. v. Jennings, No. 08-13434 (March 16, 2010), the Court affirmed convictions and sentences arising out of a scheme to sell fraudulent workers’ compensation insurance.

The Court rejected the defendant’s challenge to the reliance by the government’s expert on hearsay evidence. The Court found that the hearsay was based on “general practice in the field” regarding industry requirements, “gleaned from years of working within the industry and its professionals.”

The Court found that a witness’ testimony about parallel civil litigation was too fleeting to overturn the district court’s denial of a mistrial.

The Court declined to find that treating the receipts instead of the profits as the subject of money laundering constituted plain error under the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. Santos. The fragmented opinions in that case yielded a precedent limited only to money laundering in unlicensed gambling cases – which this case was not.

The Court rejected a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, citing the district court’s finding that the defendant “defrauded his victims of their rightful benefits out of sheer greed and in doing so caused great suffering.”

Frank: Un-Mirandized Statement to Cambodian Police Is Admissible

In U.S. v. Frank, No. 07-13685 (March 15, 2010), the Court affirmed convictions for traveling to Cambodia and engaging in illicit sexual conduct with minor children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(b) and 2251A(b)(2)(A).

The Court rejected Frank’s argument that his un-Mirandized statements to Cambodian police in Cambodia should have been suppressed. The Court noted that Miranda only applies in a foreign country if American officials are involved in the questioning or if the questioning shocks the judicial conscience; here, American officials played no role in Frank’s questioning. Moreover, Frank’s questioning did not shock the judicial conscience.

The Court also rejected Frank’s challenge to the extraterritorial application of § 2251A. The Court found that Congress intended to apply this statute extraterritorially, because it criminalized conduct by a person who “travels in foreign commerce” and engages in any illicit sexual conduct.

The Court rejected the argument that Frank was not guilty of the “purchase” of a minor for the purpose of producing a sexually explicit visual depiction, because he paid the minors directly, not a third-party. “In the context of child prostitution, the minor herself is turned into an object or commodity, by selling her body to be used by the defendant for a certain purpose.”

The Court found that the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant in closing as a “shark” was not improper because it was responding to the defense characterization of the defendant as a “dolphin.”

Turning to sentencing, the Court found no plain error in imposing multiple sentences for both traveling to Cambodia and engaging in illicit sexual conduct, even though all the criminal activity happened during one single trip.

Davis: Pre-Gant Caselaw Excuses Unlawful Search

In U.S. v. Davis, No. 08-16654 (March 11, 2010), recognizing a Circuit split on this issue, the Court held that even though the police search of a vehicle was unreasonable under Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), the fruits of the search need not be suppressed, because the police were relying in good faith on pre-Gant precedent which authorized their search.

The Court first held that the constitutionality of a search, and the applicability of the exclusionary rule to suppress the fruits of the search, are separate questions. The application of the exclusionary rule is subject to the “good faith exception.” The Court emphasized that pre-Gant law was clear, and “unambiguously” authorized the search in this case. Consequently, the Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule.

Ternus: Stolen paintings conviction upheld

In U.S. v. Ternus, No. 07-14708 (March 2, 2010), the Court affirmed Ternus’ conviction for conspiracy to transport in interstate commerce stolen goods, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2314. The case involved four paintings stolen from a museum in Nice, France.

The Court rejected the argument that there was insufficient evidence that Ternus intended to transport the paintings in foreign commerce. The Court noted that Ternus pled guilty to the charge, including its jurisdictional element.

The Court also rejected the argument that the district court erred in accepting his guilty plea because of the lack of evidence on the jurisdictional element, pointing out that Ternus’ plan was for the paintings were to be brought to the United States.

Williams: Counsel not ineffective for failing to call psychopharmacologist

In Williams v. Allen, No. 08-11905 (March 4, 2010), the Court denied habeas relief to an Alabama death row inmate convicted of two murders in 1992.

The Court rejected Williams’ argument that his counsel was ineffective for pursuing an insanity defense. It was a “sound strategic decision.”

The Court also rejected Williams’ claim that counsel failed to adequately investigate an intoxication defense. The Court found that even had a psychopharmacologist been called as a witness by the defense, the jury could have concluded that the murders were purposeful, and therefore deserving of the death penalty.

Finally, the Court rejected the argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to burden-shifting jury instructions. The Court found that the jury was instructed to presume sanity, not intent.

Culver: 720-month sentence for child pornographer

In U.S. v. Culver, No. 07_14708 (March 2, 2010), the Court affirmed the conviction and 720-month sentence imposed on a defendant convicted of producing child pornography of his stepdaughter.

The Court rejected the argument that the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to criminalize Culver’s conduct, pointing out that “pornography begets pornography, regardless of its origin.”

The Court also rejected Culver’s Rule 404(b) challenge to admission of evidence that he used a stun gun against his stepdaughter, pointing out that this evidence was relevant to show that he rendered her unconscious to make the tape of her.

The Court also affirmed the exclusion of evidence of the victim’s prior sexual history. The Court found that Culver was given adequate opportunity to question the victim on cross-examination.

Turning to sentencing, the Court found it not unreasonable for the sentencing court to have increased Culver’s sentence based on findings that he drugged and shocked the victim, despite a State jury’s acquittal of Culver on these charges. The Court noted that a sentencing court can rely on acquitted conduct.

Rozier: Felon in Possession Crime is Constitutional

In U.S. v. Rozier, No. 08-17061 (March 4, 2010), the Court rejected the argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which criminalizes a felon’s possession of a firearm, is unconstitutional in light of the right to bear arms recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008). The Court noted that Heller stated that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”

Separately, the Court reaffirmed that life is the statutory maximum for violators of § 922(g)(1) how have been previously convicted of at least three serious drug offenses.

Brummer: Firearm forfeiture Mandatory

In U.S. v. Brummer, No. 09-13613 (March 8, 2010), the Court held that forfeiture of firearms or ammunition is mandatory for defendants convicted of knowingly and willfully failing to declare firearms to a common carrier, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e). The Court relied on the plain language of the statute, specifically its use of the word “shall” with reference to the order of forfeiture.

Bacon: Individually Attributable Quantities Only Trigger Mandatory Minimum

In U.S. v. Bacon, No. 08-10463 (March 4, 2010), the Court affirmed multi-defendant drug trafficking convictions, but vacated one sentence.

The Court rejected sufficiency of the evidence challenges, noting that the jury could rely on a defendant’s presence at a drug exchange as probative evidence.

Turning to sentencing, the Court found plain error in the district court’s failure to determine whether one defendant qualified for a mandatory minimum sentence based only on the quantity of drugs individually attributable to him.

Dodge: Transfer of sex materials to minor qualifies for sex offender registration

In U.S. v. Dodge, No. 08-10802 (March 5, 2010) (en banc), the Court held that a conviction for transferring obscene material to a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470 qualifies as a “specified offense against a minor” and therefore subjects a sex offender to SORNA registration requirements.

The Court rejected the argument that the statute by implication excluded his offense from the list of qualifying offenses, noting the “broad purpose and scope of SORNA.”

The Court held that, in determining whether an offense met the SORNA definition, courts could look to the underlying conduct, not just to the elements of the offense. Here, Dodge evinced his intent that a thirteen-year old girl view him in a sexual state. This conduct qualified as a criminal offense against a minor.

DuBose: Protective Order Sufficed to Establish 922(g)(8) violation

In U.S. v. DuBose, No. 09-11400 (March 1, 2010), the Court affirmed a defendant’s conviction for possessing a firearm while subject to a protective order, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).

The Court rejected the argument that DuBose’s protective order did not meet the statute’s requirement that it involve preventing the use of physical force. The Court pointed out that the protective order enjoined DuBose from “hurting” his wife.

The Court also rejected DuBose’s attempt to challenge the validity of the Alabama protective order under Alabama. Pointing out that the Supreme Court foreclosed collateral attacks on prior felony convictions in felon in possession cases in Lewis v. United States, the Court applied the same rule to underlying protective orders in § 922(g)(8) prosecutions.

Whitson: Non-overt act conspiracy not "crime of violence"

In U.S. v. Whitson, No. 09-10521 (Feb. 24, 2010), applying Begay v. U.S., the Court held that a prior conviction for a non-overt act conspiracy was not a “crime of violence” for purposes of Career Offender eligibility under USSG § 4B1.1

The Court noted that the South Carolina conspiracy statute under which Whitson was previously convicted does not require an overt act. Further, the “agreement” that constitutes a conspiracy is not, without more, violent or aggressive. The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit’s contrary holding that a conspiracy cannot be divorced from its violent objective, and that a conspiracy increases the likelihood of violence. The Court held that Begay requires looking at the conspiracy “alone” to determine whether the conspiracy was “violent.” “Seeing no violence or aggression in the act of agreement,” the Court concluded that it did not qualify as a “crime of violence.”

Phillips: Rule 35(a) deadline applies to 3582(c)(2) resentencings

In U.S. v. Phillips, No. 08-17248 (Feb. 23, 2010), the Court held that the seven-day deadline for correction of sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) [now 14-days, as of Dec. 1, 2009] applies to sentences imposed in response to a motion to reduce sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Because the 7-day deadline is jurisdictional, the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider the government’s motion for reconsideration, which was filed more than 7-days after the court resentenced the defendant under § 3582(c)(2). Consequently, the Court vacated the amended sentence and remanded the case with instructions to reimpose the originally (defense-favorable, though legally incorrect) § 3582(c)(2) sentence.

The Court rejected the government’s argument that Rule 35(a) did not apply to § 3582(c)(2) resentencings. The Court noted that while § 3582(c)(2) proceedings are not the same as the original sentencing, the court is still “sentencing.” Further, § 3582 expressly prohibits modification of sentence after it is entered except under specified conditions – not present in this case.

Duran: Suitcase Scandal Foreign Agent Conviction Affirmed

In United States v. Duran, No. 09-11446 (Feb. 16, 2010), the Court affirmed the convictions of a Venezuelan citizen for acting as an agent of a foreign organization, without prior notification of the Attorney General, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951.

The case arose out of the “Suitcase Scandal” involving the seizure of $800,000 in cash from a Venezuelan entering Argentina, cash intended, it was speculated, for the presidential candidate Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Duran, acting on behalf of Venezuela, had meetings in Miami in an effort to conceal responsibility for the $800,000.

The Court rejected Duran’s argument that the government had to prove that he had knowledge of the foreign agent registration requirement. The failure to register offense is a general intent offense, which does not require proof of actual knowledge. The Court also rejected the argument that the statute only punishes conduct that related to espionage, pointing out that the registration requirement applies regardless of the activity at issue, so long as it is on behalf of a foreign government.

The Court rejected the argument that Duran should have been allowed to present evidence of his ignorance of the registration requirement, because knowledge of the requirement is not an element of the offense.

The Court also rejected Duran’s argument that statements showing his lack of intent to act as an agent of Venezuela should have been admitted, finding them not sufficiently probative to constitute reversible error.

The Court rejected Duran’s 404(b) challenge to the admission of evidence of his giving kickbacks to Venezuelan government, finding that the evidence showed Duran’s intent and motive. Further, the evidence was subject to a limiting instruction. In addition, the evidence was admissible to rebut Duran’s entrapment defense.

Arnold: Granting Habeas Relief based on Brady violation

In Arnold v. Sec. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 09-11911 (Feb. 8, 2010), the Court adopted the opinion of the district court in the Middle District of Florida granting habeas relief to a Florida inmate who alleged a Brady violation based on undisclosed criminal activity by the police officer who was a primary investigator in his own case.

The district court opinion found no procedural default: it recognized that Arnold’s federal petition “slightly expanded” upon his post-conviction state claims, but the two were “the same Brady claim.”

The opinion rejected the State’s argument that, since the prosecution itself was, like Arnold, unaware of the police officer’s corrupt activities, it could not deemed to have “suppressed” this evidence. The opinion noted that the police officer was part of the “prosecution team,” and therefore his own concealment of his activities sufficed for purposes of establishing a Brady violation. Moreover, impeachment of the police officer based on his activities could have changed the outcome of the trial, because the officer testified against Arnold and provided vital identification testimony. The opinion rejected the argument that the impeachment evidence would not have been admissible, pointing out that it might actually have been unnecessary given the State’s admission that, had it known of the police officer’s activities, it would not have called him as a witness.

Patterson: Intended Loss Measured by Defendant's "Ambition"

In U.S. v. Patterson, No. 09-13354 (Feb. 8, 2010), the Court found no plain error in a calculation of “loss” for sentencing enhancement purposes under the Guidelines that resulted in dollar amount twice as large as the amount of restitution.

The Court noted that “loss” encompasses “actual loss,” or “intended loss,” whichever is greater. In calculating “intended loss,” the sentencing court uses the “reasonable mathematical limit” of an offender’s scheme; “A criminal pays the price for the ambition of his acts, not their thoroughness.” “Restitution, on the other hand, must be based on the amount of loss actually caused by the defendant’s conduct.” Consequently, the law does not require “a simple symmetry between loss and restitution.”

The Court declined to reach Patterson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on the failure to object to the sentence, noting that § 2255 is the “preferred means” for bringing such claims.

Green: Counsel Ineffective, But not prejudicially so

In Green v. Nelson, No. 08-11212 (Feb. 4, 2010), the Court granted partial habeas relief to a Georgia inmate convicted of aggravated sodomy and rape.

The Court agreed with Green that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress blood and DNA evidence on the ground that this evidence was obtained based on a false affidavit. The affidavit did contain materially false information; trial counsel did not make a strategic decision not to suppress the evidence, but failed to realize that the affidavit was false. However, the ineffectiveness did not prejudice Green, because other correct information in the affidavit would have sufficed to establish probable cause for the search for blood and DNA evidence.

Turning to the sufficiency of the evidence of the aggravated sodomy, the Court agreed with Green that there was insufficient evidence to support this conviction. Green was charged with having placed his penis in the anus of his victim. However, the Court found no evidence of this contact.

Holmes: Sufficient 1028A evidence

In U.S. v. Holmes, No. 09-14035 (Feb. 4, 2010), the Court rejected a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to a conviction of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence that she knew that Julie Ann Overton, the person whose identity Holmes fraudulently used, was an “actual person.”

The Court noted that the government presented evidence of the rigorous identification processes to which the personal information Holmes submitted about Overton was subjected. Holmes’ willingness to subject the personal information to such scrutiny established that Holmes knew, all along, that the information belonged to a real person. Further, Holmes would have known Overton’s actual existence from the repeated successful use of her personal information to obtain a passport, a driver’s licence, and identification cards.

Jules: 3582(c)(2) Requires Advance Notice of New Information

In U.S. v. Jules, No. 08-13629 (Feb. 2, 2010), the Court held that a district court that intends to rely on new information in deciding a motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) must give the defendant an opportunity to respond to the new information.

Prior to Jules’ § 3582(c)(2) resentencing, the district court received information from Probation about Jules’ alleged marijuana use while incarcerated. Based on this information, the district court denied a sentence reduction. Jules was not given any opportunity to respond to the new information.

On appeal, the Court noted that the Guidelines state that parties should be given an adequate opportunity to present information regarding sentencing factors in dispute. Further, the Court’s own caselaw requires an adequate notice and opportunity to contest facts at sentencing. The Court also relied on caselaw in two other Circuits which recognize a defendant’s right to notice of new facts on which the district court relies in a 3582(c)(2) determination. The Court distinguished caselaw in other Circuits on which the government relied.

The Court noted that on remand, the district court could hold a hearing on the new information about Jules, or may instead allow the parties to contest new information in writing.

Lott: Habeas Petitioner Not Entitled to COA

In Lott v. Florida Attorney General, No. 09-14196 (Jan. 25, 2010), the Court held that a habeas petitioner had not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and therefore was not entitled to a certificate of appealability from the denial of a habeas petition.

Lott claimed that his counsel was ineffective for failing to put on an alibi defense. However, counsel investigated the alibi defense and found no support for it. A potential alibi witness declined to testify because she would not “lie for Lott anymore.” Moreover, Lott himself voluntarily chose not to testify in support of his alibi defense.

Arnaiz: Habeas Not a Vehicle For Challenging Restitution

In Arnaiz v. Warden, No. 07-12649 (Jan. 26, 2010), the Court held that the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not encompass claims that challenge the restitution portion of a judgment of conviction. The Court reasoned that habeas is about release from custody. A challenge to restitution is not related to custody. The Court noted that offenders who are not sentenced to a term of incarceration are not entitled to challenge orders of restitution, and saw no reason to treat Arnaiz differently simply because his judgment subjected him to both incarceration and restitution.

Thompson: 2254 Petition Timely

In Thompson v. Sec. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 08-10540 (Jan. 27, 2010), the Court held that a § 2254 habeas petition was timely filed, and reversed the dismissal of the petition.

The timeliness of Thompson’s federal habeas petition turned on whether his prior “habeas” filings in Florida State courts were “properly filed” for the purpose of tolling the one-year statute of limitations of AEDPA. The State argued that they were not properly filed because Florida law requires such challenges to be made in a motion under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850, not in a “habeas petition.” The “properly filed” inquiry, however, goes to whether a court has “initial jurisdiction” over the filing. Here, Thompson “invoked the wrong statutory vehicle” but he filed in the “proper courts.” The State argued that Thompson filed in the wrong County. But the Court rejected this argument, because it went to a condition to obtaining relief, as opposed to a condition to filing.

The Court also rejected the argument that the state habeas petition should not toll the AEDPA time-limit because it incorrectly attacked his convictions, rather than challenging “unlawful detention.” The Court pointed out that Thompson alleged “that he was being illegally detained based on his unlawful convictions.”

Caraballo: Biographical Information In I-213 Immigration Forms Do Not Violate Confrontation Clause

In U.S. v. Caraballo, No. 09-10428 (Jan. 27, 2010), the Court affirmed alien smuggling convictions.

The Court found probable cause for the defendant’s arrest, and affirmed denial of the motion to suppress: Law enforcement observed a fishing boat displaying inconsistent types of fishing rods; two persons aboard were nervously scanning the shoreline; once at the boat ramp the persons were moving as quickly as possible to load the boat onto a truck; they gave inconsistent answers to questions; and they appeared “very nervous.” Further, the agents were justified in undertaking a “protective sweep” of the boat (without a warrant): the conduct of the persons questioned by law enforcement gave reason to believe that there may have been another person on board (eleven illegal aliens were found, stowed away together in a cabin). In addition, under Florida law, an officer does not need probable cause to stop a boat to check for fishing permits, and opening a cabin door falls under that authorization.

The Court rejected the argument that the admission of biographical information regarding the eleven illegal aliens from the I-213 Immigration Forms violated the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause’s prohibition on the admission of testimonial statements. The Court found that “the basic biographical information recorded on the I-213 Form is routinely requested from every alien entering the United States.” It mattered not, therefore, that the information was later used in a criminal prosecution. The primary purpose of the questioning of the aliens is to elicit biographical information required of every foreign entrant. Moreover, any error in admitting the I-213s was harmless because the presence of eleven people, only one of whom could speak English, crammed into the closed cabin of a boat in August in South Florida, coupled with the cooperating witnesses’ testimony that they knew they were engaging in illegal smuggling, established alienage.

Turning to sentencing, the Court affirmed the “reckless endangerment” enhancement. “Caraballo smuggled eleven aliens on a five-and-one-half-hour open water voyage from the Bahamas to Miami in August in a small and enclosed cabin, on a twenty-five-foot fishing boat that was not equipped with enough life jackets.”

The Court also affirmed a supervisory role sentence enhancement, noting evidence that Caraballo recruited the others.

Finally, the Court affirmed the denial of an acceptance of responsibility sentence reduction, pointing out that Caraballo contested his guilt at trial, and maintained that he was an “innocent bystander.”

Marquez: Extradition Arguments Not Raised Pre-Trial Are Waived

In U.S. v. Marquez, No. 08-12588 (Jan. 22, 2010), the Court affirmed the conviction of a defendant convicted of a RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

Marquez argued his extradition to the United States violated the “rule of specialty” and the “rule of dual criminality.” The Court pointed out, however, that Marquez failed to raise these objections prior to trial, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A), (c). Because a challenge to extradition is a challenge to the means by which personal jurisdiction is obtained – not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction – it is waivable. Here, it was waived. Consequently, Marquez waived his “rule of specialty” and “dual criminality” challenges to his conviction.

Bernal: No Improper Prosecution Bolstering

In U.S. v. Bernal-Benitez, the Court affirmed the convictions and sentences of defendants convicted of attempted cocaine-trafficking.

The Court rejected the argument that the evidence was insufficient because the government failed to establish that the cocaine “was actually cocaine,” noting that the government only had to prove that Bernal intended to obtain cocaine.

The Court also rejected Batson challenges to the government’s strike of a black juror, finding that the lower court could properly rely on the justification that the struck juror was “less educated” than the others in the venire.

The Court also rejected a challenge to the prosecutor’s improper “bolstering” arguments. The Court found that when the prosecutors asked why the FBI agents would lie and “put their badges on the line” when they testified, they were “merely acknowledging that adverse legal consequences would flow from lying under oath.”

The Court also rejected the argument that the prosecutors shifted the burden of proof when they argued that “nobody has submitted any evidence . . . to suggest to you why federal agents with years of experience [would lie].” The arguments focused on defense counsel’s ability rather than obligation to introduce evidence to support their credibility arguments.

The Court rejected the argument that one co-defendant’s Miranda rights were violated. The Court noted that even though the defendant had not signed his Miranda waiver form, this was not conclusive evidence. The district court therefore justifiably credited the agents’ testimony that the defendant had orally waived his Miranda rights.

The Court also rejected the defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of his statement. The defendant pointed out that his written statement was in English, a language he did not speak. The Court, however, credited the agents’ testimony that the statement was translated for him.

Turning to sentencing, the Court rejected two defendants’ challenges to the denial of a minor role sentence reduction. The defendants pointed out that they remained in the vehicle while the drug buy was being negotiated, and had played no role in its planning. Further, they only brought cash in the amounts of $3,000 and $8,000 to a meeting to buy $35,000 of drugs. The Court found that all defendants “were engaged in a joint enterprise and that contributing $3,000 or $8,000 to a $35,000 drug buy was significant involvement.”

Reed: Not Ineffective To Agree Not to Put On Evidence

In Reed v. Sec. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 09-10059 (Jan. 11, 2010), the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief to a Florida inmate sentenced to death for a 1986 murder.

The Court rejected the argument that counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase when he agreed with the prosecutor not to put on any mitigating evidence in exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement not to present aggravating evidence. The Court noted that counsel had done a reasonable investigation of Reed’s background, that the mitigating evidence would not have changed the outcome, and that Reed himself had instructed counsel not to put on mitigating evidence. Moreover, Reed could not show that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s decision, pointing out that evidence about Reed’s background that would have come in would have included “devastating” instances of his attacks on his grandmother.

Ward: Bailiff-Juror Communication Requires New Penalty Phase Hearing

In Ward v. Hall, No. 07-11360 (Jan. 4, 2010), the Court granted habeas relief to a Georgia death-row inmate based on improper bailiff-jury communications during the penalty phase.

During jury deliberations in the penalty phase, the jurors were having difficulty imposing the death penalty, and three jurors asked the bailiff whether life without parole was an option. See generally, Reining in Juror Misconduct: Practical Suggestions for Judges and Lawyers, 84 Fla. B. J. 9 (Jan. 2010). The bailiff responded that it was not an option. Under Georgia law, if the jury so inquires of the trial judge, the judge is required to inform the jury that it is not to consider the question of parole. “By advising that life without parole was not an option, the bailiff left the [false] impression that Ward could or would be released on parole if the jury sentenced him to life imprisonment.” The Court added: “We do not take lightly our decision to reverse a death sentence rendered eighteen years ago. Nevertheless the record establishes that the improper bailiff-juror communication violated Ward’s constitutional rights and prejudiced him. Accordingly he is entitled to a new penalty phase hearing.”

Boyd: New mitigating evidence would not have changed outcome

In Boyd v. Allen, No. 07-14098 (Jan. 8, 2010), the Court (2-1) (Barkett, J., dissenting) reversed a grant of habeas relief to an Alabama inmate sentenced to death for two 1986 murders. The Court recognized that the inmate’s trial counsel were ineffective for failing at the penalty phase to present mitigating evidence based on Boyd’s troubled childhood. However, balancing this evidence de novo against the aggravating evidence against Boyd of the brutal nature of his murders, the Court found no reasonable probability that the mitigating evidence would have changed the outcome of the penalty phase of the proceedings.

White: Firearm Possession Prohibition on Domestic Violence Convicts Valid post-Heller

In U.S. v. White, No. 08-16010 (Jan. 11, 2010), the Court affirmed a conviction for possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

The Court rejected the argument that one police officer’s recollection that he smelled marijuana was not credible, because the other arresting officer did not recall a smell of marijuana. Because the testimony was credible, the smell gave the officer reasonable suspicion for further investigation – which led him to find a firearm. In addition, the officers were outnumbered by the persons they found in a car, after getting a complaint about loud music in a high crime area late at night, and the occupants of the car could not produce identification.

The Court also rejected the argument that White’s prior conviction did not qualify under the firearm possession statute. White had been convicted of conduct involving a dispute in which he tried to choke his live-in girlfriend. A dispute with a live-in girlfriend qualifies as a “domestic dispute.”

Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Heller, striking down Washington D.C.’s firearm ban, made unconstitutional the statute criminalizing firearm possession by a person convicted of domestic violence. The Court found that this statute was one of the “longstanding prohibitions” on firearm possession that Heller did not call into doubt.

Lopez: "Help" Instruction ok in Alien Smuggling case

In U.S. v. Lopez, No. 08-13605 (Dec. 22, 2009) (2-1) (Barkett, J., dissenting in part), the Court affirmed convictions for encouraging or inducing aliens to enter the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I ) and § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).

During deliberations, the jury asked what “encourage” meant. Over defense objection, the district court instructed that encourage means, inter alia, “to help.” Affirming this instruction, the Court noted that dictionary definitions of “encourage” included “help.” The Court rejected the argument that this interpretation would render other portions of § 1324 superfluous, because they criminalized bringing an alien into the United States, an offense which would be redundant if helping an alien enter the United States was already a crime. The Court noted that the different subsections of the statute contained different elements, with one referencing bringing an alien “at a place other than a designated port of entry,” and another refers only to the mere act of bringing an alien to the United States.

The Court rejected the argument that the supplemental jury instruction violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 30 by contradicting an earlier jury instruction. The Court noted the discretion of district courts to expand upon initial jury instructions when a jury question arises.

Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the alien smuggling statute requires a showing that the defendant knew that an alien was inadmissible at the time he boarded the boat. The Court found no such requirement in the statute.

Randolph: Juror Death Views Justified Dismissal

In Randolph v. McNeil, No. 08-12854 (Dec. 23, 2009), the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief to a Florida death row inmate, seeing no reversible error in the District Court’s 160-page order. The Court rejected Randolph’s ineffective of assistance of counsel claim, agreeing that there was no reasonable probability that, but for his lawyer’s lack of investigation into his history would have changed the outcome. The Court also rejected the argument that a juror who answered questions inconsistently about her views on the death penalty was improperly struck from the jury, finding no clear and convincing evidence to reverse the State court finding that the juror was not credible when she said she could impose the death penalty.

Banjoko: Stow away offense does not require intent to enter U.S.

In U.S. v. Banjoko, No. 09-11402 (Dec. 23, 2009), the Court held that 18 U.S.C. §2199, which criminalizes stowing away on a vessel that enters the United States, does not require proof of the defendant’s intent to enter the United States. The statute requires only proof of intent to “obtain transportation” from a vessel without consent.

The Court also rejected Banjoko’s argument that the offense does not apply to extraterritorial conduct, relying on the plain language of the statute.

Langston: 666 convictions reversed, and affirmed.

In U.S. v. Langston, No. 08-16356 (Dec. 22, 2009), the Court reversed some convictions but affirmed others for a former Executive Director of the Alabama Fire College convicted of embezzlement.

The Court found that, for some counts, Langston was not an agent of the State of Alabama, but instead an agent of the Alabama Fire College. The Court noted that Langston served at the pleasure of the Fire College Commission, not the State of Alabama. However, the Court upheld other convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 666, finding that Langston was an agent of the State in his capacity in the Alabama Poison Center.

The Court also rejected Langston’s argument that the district court should have given an “advice of counsel” defense instruction to the jury. The Court noted the absence of evidence that Langston actually relied on any legal opinion.

The Court affirmed Langston’s 125-month sentence. The Court noted that the sentence was 43-months below the Guideline range. The Court declined to “reweigh” the factors addressed by the district court. The Court also rejected a comparison to the sentence of another offender who cooperated with the government’s investigation, noting that “there is no unwarranted disparity when a cooperating defendant pleads guilty and receives a lesser sentence than a defendant who proceeds to trial.”

White: Right to Venue Waived

In U.S. v. White, No. 08-10702 (Dec. 21, 2009), the Court held that the defendant waived any constitutional objection to the district court’s sua sponte decision to change the venue of the case from the Southern District of Alabama to the Middle District of Alabama, when he waited until after he was convicted to object to venue. .

The Court noted that an objection to a change of venue, like most rights, can be waived unless timely asserted. Here, the defendant moved pre-trial for a change of division (not of district), and his motion demonstrated his awareness of his right to a venue where the offense allegedly took place. Thus, when the district court announced before trial that it was changing the venue of the case and the defendant failed to object, he waived his right to venue. His silence was construed as an implied waived.

English: ACA supervised release revocation may exceed State maximum

In U.S. v. English, No. 09-12788 (Dec. 16, 2009), the Court held that a defendant who was convicted under the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), and who has served the state statutory maximum term of imprisonment, may be sentenced to further incarceration upon revocation of supervised release.

The defendant was convicted under ACA of DUI at a Naval Air Station in Florida. The Florida maximum punishment for this offense was five years’ incarceration. His sentence was five years, followed by three years of supervised release. After serving the sentence of incarceration, while on supervised release, English violated his conditions of supervised release, and after his revocation hearing the court imposed a 24-month term of incarceration. English appealed, claiming that the 24-month additional sentence exceeded the statutory five-year maximum for his Florida DUI offense.

The Court noted that sentencing courts are authorized to impose a term of supervised release under ACA, even if this term is in addition to the state statutory maximum. If a defendant violates supervised release, the sentencing court has the same authority that it has in non-ACA supervised release violations: to order additional incarceration in order to provide the deterrent mechanism intended by Congress. If a conflict exists between State and Federal law, the state law is not assimilated. Federal sentencing policy regarding supervised release overrides conflicting state provisions regarding maximum terms of incarceration.

Griffey: Federal govt need not give SORNA notice

In U.S. v. Griffey, No. 09-11696 (Dec. 15, 2009), the Court affirmed a defendant’s conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).

Citing U.S. v. Brown, the Court rejected claims that SORNA did not apply to Griffey because Alabama had not implemented this statute at the time he failed to register as a sex offender. The Court rejected the argument that the federal government must notify a person convicted of a sex offense of his legal duty to register under SORNA. The Court pointed out that the defendant admitted that he knew of his duty to register, and this knowledge sufficed to establish a knowing violation of the statute.

Cummings: No Ineffective Assistance Where Defendant Wanted No Mitigation Presented

In Cummings v. Sec. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 09-12416 (Dec. 4, 2009), the Court reversed a grant of federal habeas corpus to a Florida inmate sentenced to death for the 1991 murder of his girlfriend. The Court concluded that counsel was not ineffective for investigate and present more mitigation evidence at the sentencing phase.

The Court pointed out that the defendant “clearly, consistently, and adamantly insisted tht he wanted no mitigation evidence presented in the penalty phase.” Counsel did not “blindly follow” the client’s wishes, but moved for a competency evaluation. Counsel investigated the defendant’s prison records. In addition, to maintain the trust that existed between the client and him, counsel ultimately decided to abide by the client’s instructions regarding the mitigating evidence, specifically his wish that he did not want his family testifying. In addition, counsel was a veteran criminal defense, giving rise to a presumption of reasonable performance. Counsel could not be faulted for not putting on evidence of Cumming’s drug use, his family’s criminal history, or his antisocial personality disorder, not only because it was inconsistent with his chosen strategy, but also because it would have had a negative effect on the jury.

Finally, even if counsel’s performance were deemed deficient, Cummings failed to show that he was prejudiced because it is clear that he would not have authorized counsel to present mitigating evidence. In addition, even had the jury heard the mitigating evidence, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, in light of the aggravating circumstances, which included Cummings’ three prior convictions for violent felonies, and the heinous circumstances of his murder.

Hunter: Mental Retardation Tolls AEDPA deadline

In Hunter v. Ferrell, No. 08-16597 (Nov. 18, 2009), the Court held that despite the fact that an Alabama inmate missed the deadline for filing a federal habeas petition by eight years, because of his mental retardation he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on whether the filing deadline should be equitably tolled on account of his retardation.

The Court noted that Hunter alleged that his mental retardation prevented him from timely filing his habeas petition. Moreover, the record supported this claim. First, his prior pro se filings were filed with the assistance of prison law clerks. Second, a mental health expert’s report “strongly suggests that Hunter’s well-documented, irreversible mental retardation is severe enough that Hunter, by himself, is not able to understand and comply with AEDPA’s filing requirements and deadlines.”

Hammond: Death penalty affirmed for Georgia inmate

In Hammond v. Hall, No. 08-11109 (Nov. 4, 2009) (Carnes, Marcus, Pryor), the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief to a Georgia inmate sentenced to death for a 1988 murder.

The Court rejected Hammond’s Brady claim that the State suppressed its suspicions that the female accomplice who testified for the State against Hammond at trial had been his accomplice in prior assaults. The Court noted that this was not a record of prior convictions, nor “evidence.”

The Court also rejected Hammond’s request to have a shotgun tested in order to show that it was not the murder weapon. The Court noted that this request comes “years too late.”

The Court noted that an audiotape of witness testimony was suppressed, and that this audiotape might have shown that the witnesses disagreed about who had removed jewelry from the murder victim. But this discrepancy merely involved a “detail” in the evidence.

The Court also rejected the claim that the State failed to disclose the full scope of immunity of Hammond’s girlfriend, who was an accomplice in the charged murder and other Hammond crimes. The Court recognized that the failure to disclose a witness’ immunity requires a new trial if the witness is the State’s lead witness. But here there was other evidence against Hammond, and the jury knew at least of the witness immunity for the murder charge at issue.

Looking at the suppressed evidence as a whole, the Court concluded that “against the mountain of inculpatory evidence,” its confidence in the verdict was not undermined.

The Court rejected an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel’s failure to seek a mistrial during the sentencing phase of trial, when the prosecutor improperly warned the jury that if it did not sentence Hammond to death, he would someday be a free man. Under Georgia law, this improper argument triggers a right to a mistrial, but trial counsel instead accepted the trial court’s curative instruction. The Court deferred to the ruling of the Georgia courts that any ineffectiveness did not result in prejudice to Hammond, because of the aggravating circumstances and the trial court’s curative instruction. The Court found inadequate support in Supreme Court caselaw for defendant’s argument that the failure to obtain a mistrial is, of itself, prejudice. Further, the Georgia mistrial statute did not embody a constitutional right to not have the jury be aware of the possibility of parole if a death sentence is not imposed. Finally, the Court noted that the Georgia statute, by concealing truthful information about the defendant’s parole eligibility, does not make the sentencing process more fair or reliable.

Brown: SORNA provides adequate registration requirement notice

In U.S. v. Brown, No. 08-17244 (Nov. 5, 2009), the Court affirmed a conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), and the imposition of a sentence that included a life term of supervised release.

On plain error review, the Court rejected a challenge to the life term of supervised release was invalid. At his guilty plea colloquy, the court incorrectly told the defendant that he faced a maximum three-year term of supervised release. The PSI correctly stated the life term. The Court noted the error at the guilty plea colloquy was plain, but there was no prejudice because Brown did not establish that he would not have pled guilty had he known that the maximum supervised release term was life instead of three years.

The Court rejected the argument that Brown could not have violated SORNA by failing to register in Alabama when he moved to Alabama, as SORNA required, because Alabama had not yet implemented the SORNA requirements. The Court explained that Alabama’s requirements were different from Brown’s, and that Alabama already had a sex offender registry in place.

The Court also rejected Brown’s Due Process challenge to the registration requirement. The Court found that, by pleading guilty, he had waived the factual argument that he was prevented from registering. The Court also found that Brown received adequate notice of the registration requirement. The Court noted that Brown had actual knowledge of his duty to register in Alabama. Further, there were circumstances that would have prompted Brown to inquire further, including his own past compliance with the registration requirement in another state (North Carolina).

Harris: Fleeing Police at High Speed is "Crime of Violence"

In U.S. v. Harris, No. 08-15909 (Nov. 3, 2009), the Court affirmed reliance on a prior Florida state conviction for eluding a police officer at a high rate of speed as a “crime of violence” for Guidelines criminal history sentence enhancement purposes.

The Court noted that the elements of the offense were fleeing at high speed or a wanton disregard for safety, which are akin to crimes committed while aware that “violence might ensue.” The Court stated that a person who fled police at a high speed is the kind of person who might point a gun and pull the trigger. The crime displays a “callousness toward risk.” The conduct is also “aggressive” because highways are populated with people. The Court cited cases on other Circuits which reached the same conclusion.

Sanchez: Errors in 3559 sentence enhancements

In U.S. v. Sanchez, No. 06-15143 (Oct. 30, 2009), the Court affirmed convictions of several defendants relating to the attempted burglary of a marijuana grow-house.

The Court rejected defense challenges to the admission of cell phone records, finding them to be reliable business records. The Court also rejected challenges to the use of summaries of this evidence during trial, pointing out that the trial court had instructed the jury that the summaries were not evidence and that the evidence was the call records.

Turning to sentencing, on plain error review, the Court vacated sentences based on the federal “three strikes” law, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). As the government conceded, one defendant’s prior drug-trafficking conviction did not qualify as a prior drug trafficking offense for purposes of § 3559 because the drug quantity was unspecified, and § 3559 requires prior convictions of quantities above a specified amount in the cross-referenced federal drug statute.

The Court remanded to the district court another defendant’s argument that his prior “escape” conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence for § 3559 purposes. The Court noted that the district court had erroneously believed that the defendant could not raise this challenge to his sentence.

Finally, the Court found no procedural or substantive error in the district court’s upward departure and upward variance based on his criminal history. The Court noted that the district court had stated that it had considered the § 3553 factors.

Tate: 946-month sentence affirmed for bank robber

In U.S. v. Tate, No. 09-10288 (Oct. 30, 2009), the Court affirmed a defendant’s convictions for multiple bank robberies and firearm-possessions.

The Court rejected Tate’s challenge to the warrantless search of his home. The Court pointed out that probable cause suffices to justify search of a home when one would expect the defendant to have hidden stolen materials at his home. Here the circumstances established probable cause.

The Court also rejected Tate’s argument that the district court should have invited defense counsel to state whether he had any Batson challenges before the jury is sworn. The Court declined to create a new rule requiring the Court to ask for Batson objections.

Turning to sentencing, and recognizing a Circuit conflict on the issue, the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) requires that sentence for using a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence be imposed consecutively. The Court also rejected Tate’s challenge to the reasonableness of his 946-month sentence, pointing out that it was within the Guideline range, and noting Tate’s escalating criminal history since his teenage years.

Maples: No Excuse for Procedural Default

In Maples v. Allen, No. 07-15187 (Oct. 26, 2009), the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief to an Alabama death-row inmate.
After his murder conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in the Alabama courts, Maples, represented by counsel, filed for collateral relief in Alabama state court. The court denied relief, and Maples’ lawyers neglected to file a timely appeal. The Alabama courts found that the deadline for filing an appeal barred Maples from pursuing collateral relief. Maples brought a federal habeas action, alleging the same claims asserted in the Alabama collateral relief suit. The Court found that these claims were procedurally defaulted.
The Court found that Maples could not excuse the procedural default, because he was not entitled to representation in his collateral proceeding, and therefore could not establish ineffective assistance.
The Court rejected Maples’ argument that the Alabama trial court should sua sponte have given the jury an instruction regarding manslaughter and voluntary intoxication. The Court found no such requirement in the caselaw, and noted that the evidence would not have supported a voluntary intoxication defense.

Velez: Criminal Defense attorney transactions exempt

In U.S. v. Velez, No. 09-10199 (Oct. 26, 2009), the Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a money-laundering count in a prosecution against a criminal defense lawyer, in which the government charged that the lawyer approved of the transfer of funds for a drug dealer’s defense knowing that they were derived from criminal activity.
The Court relied on 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f), which exempts from money-laundering prosecution "any transaction necessary to preserve a person’s representation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment." The Court rejected the government’s argument that the plain meaning of this statute had been modified by a subsequent Supreme Court decision. The Court pointed out that this decision involved a different, civil forfeiture statute. Consequently, the decision had no bearing on the exemption statute.

Lee: "Walkaway" offense not "violent felony" under ACCA

In U.S. v. Lee, No. 08-14724 (Oct. 26, 2009), the Court, citing Chambers v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 687 (U.S. 2009), held that a prior "walkaway" escape conviction is not a "violent felony" and therefore vacated the defendant’s 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Court affirmed the felon in possession conviction.
The Court rejected Lee’s Fourth Amendment challenge to the seizure of a gun from the glove compartment of a car in which he was a passenger. The Court found that, as a passenger, Lee lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle.
The Court also rejected Lee’s argument that the judge should not have used his own ruler and car keys to demonstrate for the jury the concepts of actual and constructive possession.
Turning to sentencing, the Court applied the approach of the Supreme Court in Begay and Chambers, and concluded that Lee’s prior conviction, which was based on his leaving a halfway house without permission, was not a crime of violence. The Court cited similar decisions in other Circuits which reached the same conclusion in light of Begay and Chambers. The Court noted that Lee’s walkaway offense did not involve "aggression," and was not the type of conduct "that one hears about and remarks, ‘that’s the kind of thing an armed career criminal would do.’"

Quintina: Ethnicity not basis for police encounter

In U.S. v. Quintana, No. 08-12967 (Oct. 22, 2009), the Court rejected a defendant’s claim that his right to Equal Protection was violated when the police initiated a consensual encounter with him – an encounter which ultimately led to a conviction for illegal re-entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) – based on their belief that he appeared to be of Middle Eastern ethnicity. The Court found that it did not need to reach the question whether a consensual encounter can give rise to an Equal Protection violation, because the record showed that the encounter in Quintana’s case was not based on Quintana’s apparent race or ethnicity, but on the police’s interest in questioning him about why he showed up a nightclub with a video camera and did not want to go in, and took flight upon seeing the police.

Chavez: Simultaneous Bench and Jury Trials Ok

In U.S. v. Chavez, No. 08-12638 (Oct. 16, 2009), the Court affirmed drug trafficking convictions and sentences.
Several defendants were indicted in the case. One pled not guilty. Four pled guilty but reserved the right to have a bench trial requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the drug quantities. The five went to trial together. The trial court did not disclose to the jury that some defendants had pled guilty; the verdict form ultimately only sought a verdict as to one defendant.
The Court rejected this defendant’s argument that his motion for a severance should have been granted. While acknowledging the novelty of simultaneous jury and bench trials, and declining to endorse the technique, the Court found no prejudice.
The Court rejected the argument that a mistrial should have been granted when a government witness, in response to a question on cross-examination, answered: "The only way to know [the answer] is through the Defendant." The Court found that curative instructions cured the error, which was all but invited by defense counsel’s question.
The Court also rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, noting the abundant circumstantial evidence, and other evidence.
Turning to sentencing, the Court rejected a challenge to the reasonableness of Chavez’ life sentence. The Court noted that the sentence was consistent with the Guidelines.
The Court rejected another defendant’s sentencing challenge. The Court noted that the sentence was based on cash found at the defendant’s residence, which the sentencing court converted to methamphetamine quantities. The Court found the inference that the cash came from drug trafficking to be reasonable.

Martinez: Orchestrator not automatically organizer

In U.S. v. Martinez, No. 08-13846 (Oct. 5, 2009) (Marcus, Hill & Voorhees, b.d.), the Court reversed an "organizer or leader" sentence enhancement, under USSG § 3B1.1(a), that had been imposed on a defendant convicted of marijuana trafficking.
At his plea colloquy, Martinez admitted that he "orchestrated" weekly shipments of mail parcels containing marijuana from Texas to various locations in the Middle District of Florida. Despite this admission, the Court concluded that the government failed to establish that Martinez was an "organizing or leader," as defined by the seven explanatory factors listed in Comment four of USSG § 3B1.1.
The Court found that the term "orchestrate" is not synonymous with control. Orchestrate may mean no more than coordinating a transaction, as opposed to creating or managing it.
Further, the government presented no evidence that Martinez had decision-making authority. The "bare" record also did not indicate Martinez’ relative responsibility in relation to others. Nor was there evidence that Martinez recruited any co-conspirators, claimed a larger share of the proceeds of the crime, or whether he acted at the behest of a supervisor. At the sentencing hearing, Martinez alleged that he did not know who the leader of the group was. While Martinez admitted that he had co-conspirators, the evidence did not indicate that these persons were his subordinates.
The Court stated that at re-sentencing, the government could present evidence in support of the claimed leadership enhancement.

Faris: Proposed Guideline Amendment does not affect binding Circuit precedent

In U.S. v. Faris, No. 08-16336 (Sept. 23, 2009), the Court upheld the conviction and sentence of a defendant convicted of possession of child pornography, and enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity.
The Court rejected Faris’ argument that his prosecution violated the Commerce Clause. The Court pointed out that Faris used the internet, and the internet is an instrumentality of interstate commerce.
The Court also rejected Faris’ argument that the Necessary and Proper Clause did not confer authority to prosecute him. The Court noted that Congress has "substantial leeway" in how to regulate purely intrastate activity that it deems can, in the aggregate, frustrate the broader regulation of interstate economic activity.
Turning to sentencing, the Court rejected Faris’ argument that his sentence should not have been enhanced for having "influenced" a "minor," because the "minor" in his case was a law enforcement officer. The Court recognized that the applicable Guideline is scheduled to be amended on November 1, 2009, to provide that the enhancement does not apply in a case where the only minor is a law enforcement officer. However, the precedent of the Eleventh Circuit, which is contrary to this amendment, remains binding, and the Guideline amendment has no force until adopted.

Rhode: No ineffective investigation of mitigation

In Rhode v. Hall, No. 08-16960 (Sept. 17, 2009), the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief to a Georgia inmate sentenced to death for three 1998 murders.
The Court rejected all of Rhode’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Court found that counsel adequately investigated mitigation evidence, having, inter alia, traveled out of state to interview ten possible mitigation witnesses.
The Court also rejected a challenge to the presentation of mitigation evidence, pointing out that defense counsel called nine witnesses during the penalty phase. Counsel could not be faulted for not calling witnesses that counsel viewed as cumulative, or for presenting evidence that the jury might have viewed as aggravating, not mitigating.
The Court distinguished cases where counsel had failed to investigate voluminous mitigating evidence, or failed to examine the files that the prosecutor had warned would be used at trial.

Segarra: 924(c) means consecutive sentences in all cases

In U.S. v. Segarra, No. 08-17181 (Sept. 15, 2009), the Court, joining the majority of Circuits to have addressed this question of statutory interpretation, held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) mandates a consecutive sentence for firearm possession offense in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, even when the statutory mandatory minimum for the drug trafficking crime exceeds the mandatory minimum for the firearms offense. The Court rejected the Second Circuit’s contrary reading of the statute.
Given the Court’s interpretation of § 924(c), Segarra’s waiver of his right of appeal did not give him any basis to appeal his sentence. The Court therefore dismissed his appeal.

Jordan: Rejecting Government Cross-Appeal of Probation Sentence

In U.S. v. Jordan, No. 06-12563 (Sept. 11, 2009), the Court affirmed convictions and sentences arising out of an Alabama Sheriff’s unlawful use of the National Crime Information Center database to obtain the criminal records of those who voted in a Sheriff’s reelection race (which the Sheriff lost).
The Court rejected the argument that the indictment did not give the defendant adequate notice of the charges. The Court rejected the argument that the indictment failed to allege a crime, pointing out that it alleged that the NCIC was used for non-law enforcement purposes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.
The Court also rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, pointing out that Jordan, as a lawyer acting for Sheriff Woodward, obtained NCIC printouts, and used some of the information they disclosed.
The Court found no error in the district court’s refusal to give a "good faith" defense jury instruction, pointing that the trial court’s instruction regarding the meaning of "knowingly" and "willfully" adequately addressed the good faith defense concept. The Court also found no error in refusing the give the defendant’s "confused" instruction regarding the attorney-client privilege.
The Court also rejected the government’s cross-appeal of the sentences of six month probation. The government argued that the sentencing court erred because it "did not deem the offense to be serious." The Court found that the sentencing court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. Moreover, the sentencing court gave "appropriate consideration" to the § 3553(a) factors.

Garcia-Bercovich: Shrink wrapped boxes part of same package

In U.S. v. Garcia-Bercovich, No. 08-12061 (Sept. 10, 2009), the Court affirmed convictions for marijuana trafficking.
The Court rejected the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Garcia-Bercovich traveled across the United States to pick up packages for an individual he barely knew. He had previously been convicted of importation of marijuana. One could infer that Garcia-Bercovich deliberately avoided learning the contents of the items he picked up so as to have this defense in the event of prosecution. Lastly, the defendant’s attempt to flee was evidence of guilt.
The Court also found no Fourth Amendment violation in the search of the boxes in which marijuana was found. Marijuana was found by a private search in a single box which came shrink wrapped on a single pallet with other boxes. The other boxes were then opened by police without a warrant. The Court rejected the argument that the search of the other boxes required a warrant, finding that all the boxes were part of the same "package" because they were shrink wrapped together on the same pallet.

Johnson: State Probation does not Suspend Federal Supervised Release

In U.S. v. Johnson, No. 09-10351 (Sept. 2, 2009), the Court held that time spent serving a State sentence on probation, while under a federal sentence of supervised release, does toll the running of the period of supervised release. The fact that the State sentence of imprisonment was suspended so that Johnson could serve it on probation did not affect the tolling analysis. Hence, Johnson’s alleged violations of his conditions of federal supervised release, which occurred, when one excludes the time spent on probation on a State sentence, within the federal supervised release three-year term, could be the basis for revocation of supervised release. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s revocation of Johnson’s supervised release, based on violations that occurred within the three-year period.

McIntosh: Second Indictment must be dismissed after guilty plea to first indictment

In U.S. v. McIntosh, No. 08-15549 (Aug. 27, 2009), the Court held that Double Jeopardy barred the government from indicting a defendant for a second time, after the defendant pled guilty to a first indictment charging the same offenses, but on different (erroneous) dates.
A first indictment charged drug and firearm offenses occurring in February 2007. The defendant pled guilty. However, prior to sentencing, the government informed the court that the date of the indictment was wrong: the offenses occurred in November 2005. The government obtained a second indictment, and moved to dismiss the first one.
The Court noted that, for Double Jeopardy purposes, jeopardy attaches when a court accepts a guilty plea. It is a conviction. Thus, here, jeopardy attached. The Court rejected the argument that the case was "exceptional," pointing out that one purpose of Double Jeopardy is to protect against "prosecutorial negligence." The Court disagreed with the district court that the dismissal of the first indictment, without prejudice, "effectively withdrew" the plea. The dismissal did not vacate the plea, or the conviction. Moreover, the defect in the indictment was not "fatal" and therefore did not justify a second indictment.
The Court also rejected the government’s argument that McIntosh had implicitly consented to the second indictment, pointing out that defense counsel had stated that he was not acquiescing in a second indictment.
The Court remanded the case with instructions to vacate the second indictment.

Gomez

In U.S. v. Gomez, No. 09-11031 (Aug. 28, 2009), the Court held that it was not harmless error for the trial judge to fail to instruct the jury – contrary to the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Flores-Figueroa v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 1886 (2009) – that the government had to show that the defendant knew that the means of identification that was the subject of the identity theft charged under 18 U.S.C. §1028A(a)(1) "belonged to another person."
The Court noted defense argument that Gomez used a false identification document in order to get a job, to fulfill "the American dream," and not to "live off of somebody else . . . or steal." The Court noted that the evidence supported this defense; the jury could have found that the government failed to prove that Gomez knew that the identification documents belonged to another person. The error therefore was not harmless. The Court vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings.

Felts: No Plain Error in not instructing jury in the conjunctive

In U.S. v. Felts, No. 08-11450 (Aug. 21, 2009), the Court held that there was no plain error in a money laundering jury instruction.
The money laundering statute at issue made it unlawful to transport funds either to promote specified unlawful activity, or to conceal the nature of the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity. The jury instruction in Felts charged the violation of the statute in the conjunctive, that is, the jury was instructed in a single paragraph that either intent to promote or intent to conceal would be valid bases to convict. Felts argued that the jury should have been instructed that it had to agree as to which mental state existed.
Rejecting the argument, the Court noted that the distinction between the two mental states was "minimal." Thus, there was little, if any, risk of unfairness in not treating each mental state – intent to conceal vs. intent to promote – as a separate violation.

Maxwell: Convictions for MIA Contract Fraud Affirmed

In U.S. v. Maxwell, No. 07-11301 (Aug. 19, 2009), the Court affirmed convictions and sentences arising out of a fraudulent scheme to obtain construction contracts for work at Miami International Airport set aside for socially and economically disadvantaged companies.
The Court rejected the argument that the district court violated the Sixth Amendment when it limited defense cross-examination of a government witness. The Court found that the examination exposed facts that were more than sufficient to allow the defense to argue that the witnesses were biased. Further, the topic on which the defense sought to cross-examine a witness was "of no palpable impeachment value." In addition, certain questions "were beyond the scope" of direct examination.
The Court rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, finding "ample" evidence that Maxwell made material misrepresentations. The Court found that the jury could conclude that the supposed subcontractor performed no commercially useful function.
The Court found no error in refusing to give the jury instructions Maxwell proposed. These instructions would have addressed the ambiguity of the regulations at issue. The Court stated that the "good faith defense" given by the district court were sufficient to allow Maxwell to argue in closing argument that he did not have the requisite criminal intent.
Turning to sentencing, the Court rejected Maxwell’s challenge to the loss calculation. The Court found that the district court actually understated the amount of the loss, because it relied on the 6% profit on the government contracts, not the entire value of the diverted contracts of over $7 million. However, because the government did not cross-appeal this issue, the Court did not remand for resentencing.

Bonilla: Double Jeopardy Violation in Identity Theft Charges

In U.S. v. Bonilla, No. 08-112127 (Aug. 18, 2009), the Court – on plain error review after a guilty plea – reversed identify theft convictions, because the indictment was multiplicitous and violative of Double Jeopardy.
The defendant was convicted under both 18 U.S.C. § 1208(a)(7) and 1028(a)(1), which address access device fraud. The Court found that both of the statutes contain "identical" elements. "This is a clear example of one act violating two distinct statutory provisions and therefore violating the protection against double jeopardy."
Turning to the factual record at the defendant’s plea colloquy, the Court found that (without the need to depend on facts outside the record, which the guilty plea would have waived), the same factual information supported both charged offenses.
Bonilla’s time in prison, however, will remain the same. His sentence on the duplicative counts ran concurrent to sentence on the remaining counts.
The Court found no duplicativeness violative of Double Jeopardy in Bonilla’s conviction under § 1028A, because this statute authorized cumulative punishment, by providing for an additional two-year penalty in addition to any term of imprisonment for the underlying offense.
The Court rejected Bonilla’s challenge to the district court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences, noting that the district court has discretion to do so under the Guidelines, and here noted the seriousness of Bonilla’s crimes.

Kaley: Defendants entitled to hearing on seizure of assets pretrial

In U.S. v. Kaley, No. 07-13010 (Aug. 18, 2009), the Court held that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to lift an injunction preventing the defendants from encumbering their home in order to raise money to pay for defense counsel. Citing U.S. v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1989), the Court held that the district court should have held a hearing to weigh the suffering of the defendants from the denial of counsel of choice against the government’s interest in recovering the assets seized.

Ponce: Georgia Commercial Vehicle Inspection Is Valid

In U.S. v. Ponce-Aldona, No. 08-13144 (Aug. 12, 2009), the Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to a "safety checkpoint" stop of the defendant’s truck.
Georgia police set up a safety checkpoint at an exit to I-85 northbound, to pull over commercial vehicles for inspection. Officers spotted the defendant driving a truck who appeared to notice the officers and then bypassed the exit. The officers stopped and searched the truck and found cocaine. Ponce challenged the search under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court held that the search fell within the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Court explained that an administrative inspection of a closely regulated business is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement for a search. The Court found that the Georgia inspection program adequately advised that searches would be made on a regular basis and were not merely discretionary. The regulations provided that Department of Motor Vehicle enforcement officers were authorized to stop and inspect commercial motor vehicles. Further, the discretion of the inspecting officers was adequately limited because only DMVS officers could inspect, and inspections are limited to public highways, searches are limited to the cargo area and documents of commercial vehicles. Further, time and place restrictions are not feasible because trucks could easily avoid fixed checkpoints. The Court noted that for this inspection, all commercial vehicles that passed by the checkpoint without stopping were more likely than not going to be pulled over and inspected.

Windom: Counsel not ineffective in death penalty phase

In Windom v. Sec. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 07-15876 (Aug. 10, 2009), the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief to a Florida inmate sentenced to death for three murders in 1992.
The Court found that even assuming Windom’s counsel’s limited investigation into Wiondom’s background and mental health constituted deficient performance, Windom was not prejudiced thereby. The evidence of Windom’s background and mental health would not have affected the outcome, because of overwhelming evidence of premeditation, and the relative weakness of the conclusions of mental health experts.
The Court also rejected an ineffective challenge to counsel’s opening and closing arguments. Counsel argued for the existence of the statutory mitigating circumstances of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Counsel’s candor about the crimes did not prejudice Windom, in light of the strength of the State’s case for death.

Bobb: No Double Jeopardy Violation on Receiving and Posssing Child Porn

In U.S. v. Bobb, No. 07-13252 (Aug. 6, 2009), the Court rejected a Double Jeopardy challenge to convictions for receiving and possessing child pornography.
The Court agreed with Bobb that in the abstract it could violate Double Jeopardy to prosecute a defendant for both "receiving" and "possessing" child pornography, because this would be multiple punishment for the same offense. The Court noted that it is impossible to receive a thing without also possessing it. The Court found no intent of Congress to punish the same conduct twice, under separate statutes.
However, Ball was charged with receiving child pornography on a separate date from the date on which he was charged with possessing additional child pornography. Thus, the indictment charged two separate and distinct offenses. Thus, the Double Jeopardy challenge ultimately fell short.

Philmore: Right to Counsel did not yet attach

In Philmore v. McNeil, No. 07-13637 (July 23, 2009), the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief to a Florida inmate sentenced to death for a 1997 murder.
The Court rejected Philmore’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Philmore argued that his defense counsel in a bank robbery case was ineffective in allowingd him to speak to law enforcement. In his discussions, Philmore divulged information that incupalted him in a murder with which he had not (yet) been charged. The Court held that defense counsel in the bank robbery could not have been constitutionally deficient in the murder case, because Philmore had not been charged with murder, and no Sixth Amendment right had yet attached.
The Court also found no ineffectiveness in counsel’s failure to prevail on a Batson claim when a member of the jury panel was struck by the prosecution. The Court pointed out that counsel challenged the strike.
The Court found no ineffectiveness in failing to call an expert on Philmore’s mental impairment, as his testimony would have contradicted other defense experts.’
Finally, the Court noted that Philmore’s challenge to the state court’s failure to taking account of the mitigating evidence of mental disturbance was procedurally defaulted.

Carroll: Atkins does not compel post-conviction hearing

In Carroll v. Sec. DOC, No. 08-14317 (July 17, 2009), the Court found no constitutional violation in a Florida state court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing, in post-conviction hearings, to a death row inmate who claimed his mental retardation exempted him from the death penalty.
The Court found no support for Carroll’s argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded, compelled Florida state courts to grant an evidentiary hearing in post-conviction proceedings, particularly where three prior proceedings had considered his claim of mental retardation.
The Court also rejected Carroll’s argument that Atkins must be extended to the mentally ill, not just the mentally retarded. This would be a new rule of constitutional law, which are not created on habeas review.

Dasher: A piece of foolish advice

In Dasher v. Witt, No. 08-10363 (11th Cir. July 13, 2009), the Court granted habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel
Dasher decided to reject a plea offer to be sentenced to 13 months, and opted to plead guilty to cocaine trafficking charges "straight up," that is, without any agreement, based on his attorney’s advice that he doubted the sentence would exceed 13 months, and might be less. Once the judge learned of Dasher’s criminal history, he imposed a 10-year sentence.
The Court held that counsel was not ineffective in failing to investigate Dasher’s criminal history. The record supported an implicit finding that counsel asked Dasher about his prior criminal record. Moreover, failure to undertake an independent investigation was not constitutionally ineffective when counsel relied on information apparently in the hands of the prosecutor.
However, it was "a piece of foolishness" to advise Dasher that if he pled "straight up" he would receive little more than 12 months. Counsel was aware of other felonies to which Dasher was pleading guilty to, around the same time. Nor was the bad advice cured by the judge’s advice to Dasher that he had "total discretion" to sentence him up to 30 years, because Dasher would not have been worried this possibility, given counsel’s advice. "Whether or not he had a lengthy prior criminal record, Dasher was clearly risking a sentence of substantially more than thirteen months, and there was certainly no reason to believe he would do better.
Because Dasher had already served all but five months of his sentence, the court modified the State sentence to time-served. "Our discretion to formulate such a remedy, without disturbing the judgment of conviction, derives from 28 U.S.C. § 2243, which authorizes federal habeas courts to ‘dispose of the matter as law and justice requires.’"

Land: Prosecutor Speculation in Closing Argument Error, but Not Reversible Error

In Land v. Allen, No. 08-15254 (July 10, 2009), the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief to an Alabama inmate sentenced to death for murder.
The Court held that despite evidence that a statement was taken from Land by Alabama police while he was in a semi-fetal position, with his hands covering his face, the totality of the circumstances did not indicate that his statement was involuntary.
The Court recognized that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that "I determine the voluntariness of the statement [given by Land to police]." However, in view of the remainder of the instructions, this instruction by itself did so infect the entire trial so as to violate due process.
The Court also recognized that the prosecutor, in a case where the facts were all circumstantial, made improper closing argument when he speculated about the words that Land exchanged with the victim before murdering her. While the Court did not "condone the prosecutor’s behavior," it found that this misconduct did not so infect the trial as to make the resulting conviction invalid.
Finally, the Court did not find ineffective assistance of counsel in the failure to put on mitigating evidence about Land’s upbringing, noting the strategic decision behind it.

Goings: Ok for Georgia police to chase into Florida unauthorized

In U.S. v. Goings, No. 08-15705 (July 7, 2009), the Court, citing the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Virginia v. Moore, 128 S.Ct. 1598 (2008) (no Fourth Amendment violation when police officer makes an arrest prohibited by state law but based on probable cause), held that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when Georgia police, in a hot pursuit car chase, crossed into Florida without authorization and apprehended a defendant. The Court noted that it was undisputed that the Georgia police had probable cause to arrest Goings. It was therefore irrelevant whether the chase into Florida was authorized by Florida law.

Valencia-Trujillo: No Extradition Treaty, No Standing

In U.S. v. Valencia-Trujillo, No. 07-10524 (July 7, 2009), the Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of a defendant extradited from Colombia for cocaine trafficking.
The Court rejected the defendant’s "rule of specialty" argument, which claimed that he had been prosecuted in the United States for crimes outside the scope of Colombia’s extradition. The Court found that the defendant lacked "standing" to make this argument, because standing depended on the text of an extradition treaty, and the defendant was not extradited under an extradition treaty, but merely pursuant to an "extradition agreement."
The Court also rejected the argument that the jury convicted Valencia-Trujillo of predicate acts for a CCE conspiracy that were not charged in the indictment. The original indictment included "including, but not limited to" language with respect to the predicate acts, language which was broad enough to cover the predicate acts which were later added at trial.
The Court also rejected the defendant’s Franks challenge to the validity of the affidavit used by the FBI to support his extradition from Colombia. The Court found that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to improper seizures in Colombia.
Finally, the Court found no Batson violation in the government’s striking of the only Colombian-American member of the venire, noting that the person might fear retaliation against his family in the event of a guilty verdict, even though the family lived in Bogota and the defendant was from Cali.

Moran: No Notice Required Pre-Sentencing for Supervised Release Conditions

In U.S. v. Moran, No. 08-16987 (July 1, 2009), the Court found no error in the sentencing court’s imposition, without prior notice in advance of sentencing, of special conditions of supervised release to address a defendant’s proclivity to sexual misconduct.
The Court reasoned that supervised release, by its nature "comes with conditions." Based on his criminal history, which involved allegations of sexual misconduct, Moran knew that this would come up at this sentencing – and he did not request a continuance.
The Court also upheld the conditions imposed. The requirement to participate in a mental health program for sex offenders was justified by Moran’s documented history of sex-related offenses. Such a condition could be imposed even though it was unrelated to Moran’s firearm possession conviction. The condition was justified by Moran’s prior failure to register as a sex offender. Further it was proper to require Moran to register as a sex offender, given the new requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. The Court also upheld the restriction on Moran’s access to the internet.

Thomas: Law of the case doctrine does not preclude certain 2255 issues

In Thomas v. U.S., No. 06-15651 (June 30, 2009), the Court held that the "law of the case" doctrine did not preclude a federal inmate, in a § 2255 proceeding, from raising a claim of (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) infirmity of a prior state convictions which called into question his "career offender" status.
The Court noted that the "law of the case" doctrine only precludes relitigation of issues the were decided explicitly, or by necessary implication, in a prior appeal. The doctrine does not preclude consideration of matters that could have been, but were not, resolved in earlier proceedings.
Thomas had lost a prior appeal of his conviction and sentence, after his counsel filed an Anders brief and he filed a pro se brief. However, the ineffective assistance issue was not raised on direct appeal. Similarly, the invalid state court conviction was not presented on appeal, neither in the Anders brief nor in the pro se brief. Consequently, these two issues were not precluded from § 2255 consideration.

Tagg: Pipe Bombs Not Protected by Second Amendment

In U.S. v. Tagg, No 08-16860 (June 30, 2009), the Court affirmed the conviction of a defendant charged with aiding and abetting in the possession of a pipe-bomb.
The Court rejected Tagg’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, pointing out that his conduct in helping persons purchase gunpowder, watching them build pipe bombs in his garage, and telling them to go light the bombs somewhere else, sufficed.
The Court also rejected Tagg’s argument that the Second Amendment protected his activity. Unlike handguns "pipe bombs are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes."

Gari: I-123 Immigration forms if Confrontation Clause error, harmless error

In U.S. v. Gari, No. 08-10014 (June 30, 2009), the Court affirmed certain Cuban alien-smuggling convictions, reversed others, and remanded for resentencing.
The Court found sufficient evidence to convict the defendants of several counts of alien smuggling. However, as to one alien smuggling count, the evidence established that she had prior authorization to enter the United States through a designated port of entry. Accordingly, the convictions of the defendants for smuggling this alien (including the defendant who did not raise the issue on appeal) were set aside, as the statute required the government to prove that she entered without prior authorization.
The defendants challenged the government’s reliance on the aliens’ I-213 Forms as violative of the Confrontation Clause, because the defendants did not have an opportunity to cross- examine the aliens whose responses were recorded on these forms. Declining to reach the issue on the merits, the Court held that any error in admitting the forms was harmless, in view of the other evidence.
The Court rejected a defendant’s Rule 404(b) challenge to the admission of prior bad act, because the alien smuggling episode in question was "not very remote in time from the date of the charged conduct."
The Court disagreed with the government that one defendant had waived his motion to sever, pointing out that the district court had "implicitly denied" it, but agreed with the government that the denial of severance was not an abuse of discretion, pointing out that the court gave the jury a limiting instruction as to how the evidence should be considered on a defendant-specific basis.
In light of its vacatur of two convictions, the Court remanded the entire case for resentencing.

Doorball: State waiver dooms federal habeas petition

In Doorbal v. Dept. of Corrections, No. 08-15869 (June 29, 2009), the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief to a Florida inmate sentenced to death for 1994 and 1995 murders.
The Court found that the Florida Supreme Court had earlier ruled that Doorbal’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was waived because he failed to present the issue on appeal in the Florida state courts. Doorbal could not overcome this procedural default in federal courts, because it was an independent and adequate state ground for denying federal review.

Wilk: Self defense not available when defendant had reason to know law enforcement was entering his home

In U.S. v. Wilk, No. 07-14176 (June 29, 2009), the Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of a defendant charged with killing a state law enforcement officer assisting in a federal investigation.
Law enforcement officers, suspecting Wilk of possession of impeding a federal investigation, forcibly entered Wilk’s home. Wilk shot and killed one officer. His defense at trial was that he feared being attacked because he previously been a victim of anti-gay vandalism, suffered from neurological disorders, and he acted in self-defense.
The Court rejected Wilk’s challenge to the exclusion of evidence that the victim was on steroids at the time of the shooting. The Court agreed with the district court that this fact was ultimately irrelevant. The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to the exclusion of evidence that the police failed to follow proper police procedure during entry into Wilk’s residence, noting that the self-defense claim rested on Wilk’s state of mind, not the officer’s procedures.
The Court also rejected the argument that Wilk’s medical records should have been excluded, pointing out that Wilk relied on his mental status in his defense, and that the confidentiality of his records was limited if release was "required by law" – as it was here, when the grand jury subpoenaed the records.
The Court also found no error in the self-defense jury instruction. The instruction stated that, to overcome a self-defense claim, the government need oly show that the defendant "had reason to know" that the victims were law enforcement officers engaged in the performance of their duties. Wilk argued that this weakened the self-defense claim in relation to Circuit precedent. The Court rejected this argument, noting that only in "extraordinary" cases would the government be required to prove that the defendant "knew of" the victim’s status.