Johnson v. Nocco: Whether 4A Precludes LEO From Asking Passenger To Identify Himself

In Johnson v. Nocco, No. 21-10670 (Oct. 2, 2023) (Wilson, Branch, Tjoflat), the Court, in a  § 1983 action, held that the officers involved were entitled to qualified immunity. 

In so holding, the Court addressed whether the Fourth Amendment precluded a law enforcement officer—who had stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation—from asking a passenger in the vehicle to identify himself absent a reasonable suspicion that the passenger has committed, is committing, or is likely to commit a criminal offense.  Relying on officer safety, the Court answered in the negative. 

Judge Branch concurred only in the judgment of the majority, noting that she would have started and stopped at the "clearly established" prong of the qualified-immunity analysis.  She would not have addressed the first prong--whether the official violated a constitutional right--as Judge Tjoflat did in his majority opinion.  

Judge Wilson dissented.  He found it to be clearly established that law enforcement officers cannot require, by threat of arrest, that an individual identify himself absent reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.  With regard to officer safety, he noted that while traffic stops indeed pose unique risks to police officers, and those risks in turn may justify negligibly burdensome precautions, those precautions may not detour from the officer's mission.  In Judge Wilson's view, although the Supreme Court has identified specific risks inherent in traffic stops and has crafted targeted procedural remedies to address them, it has required more to be shown if officers want to justify anything beyond temporarily controlling the physical movements of passengers.  He concludes by noting that he "would go no further than to hold that in the context of a routine traffic stop, it is clear that general safety concerns do not justify officers requiring the names of passengers who are not suspected of any criminality."  He would "leave for another panel and a different record the question of whether safety concerns at traffic stops can ever reasonably justify such an intrusion."

Pate: En Banc Court Holds Former Civil Servant Not "Officer or Employee of the United States" Within Meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1521

In United States v. Pate, No. 20-10545 (Oct. 11, 2023), the en banc Court--in an opinion authored by Judge Newsom--vacated Mr. Pate's § 1521 convictions and remanded for resentencing.  

Mr. Pate filed liens against property owned by a number of people he thought wronged him, including a former Commissioner of the IRS and a former Secretary of the Treasury.  He was then charged with and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §  1521, which criminalizes the filing of retaliatory liens against the property of "an individual described in" 18 U.S.C. § 1114, which, in turn, refers to "any officer or employee of the United States."

The en banc Court considered whether a former civil servant counts as an "officer or employee of the United States," and answered in the negative.  Considering the ordinary meaning of the phrase "any officer or employee of the United States," the en banc Court determined that the phrase would not be understood by the average speaker of American English to include former officers or employees of the United States.      

Judge Rosenbaum, joined by Chief Judge William Pryor and Judge Newsom, concurred.  She wrote separately to underscore the problems with the government's argument of appealing to statutory purpose to expand the textually clear scope of criminal liability under §§ 1114 and 1521.  She noted that relying solely on congressional purpose collides with bedrock principles of due process and the separation of powers.  

Judge Brasher concurred in part, noting that the phrase "any officer of employee of the United States" may reasonably be interpreted--in the right context--to include former officers and employees.  

Judge Grant, joined by Judges Branch and Lagoa, dissented.  She wrote separately to emphasize the illogical consequences introduced by the majority's hypertechnical reading, and to put a finer point on why a comparison between this statute and two other provisions of Title 18 should not derail the Court from concluding that the best reading of § 1521 covers acts targeting both current and former federal officials.  

Judge Lagoa dissented, joined by Judges Branch and Grant.  In her view, a natural reading of § 1521, in full and in context, protects both current and former federal officers and employees who are retaliated against "on account of the performance of [their] official duties."  

 

Dunn: Affirming Denial of Motion to Dismiss Indictment

In United States v. Dunn, No. 22-11731 (Oct. 10, 2023) (Jordan, Rosenbaum, Hull), the Court affirmed the denial of Mr. Dunn's motion to dismiss his indictment.

Mr. Dunn was arrested on a criminal complaint at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic--on March 10, 2020--but was not formally indicted until December 1, 2020.  He argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his indictment for failure to indict him within 30 days from his arrest--as required by the Speedy Trial Act.

The Court found that the pandemic-related continuances in 2020--that continued grand jury sessions five times in the ends of justice spanning March 26, 2020 to November 16, 2020--were not an abuse of discretion and were within the ends-of-justice exception to the Speedy Trial Act.    

Steiger: Vacating Sentence and Remanding for Resentencing

In United States v. Steiger, No. 22-10742 (Oct. 3, 2023) (William Pryor, Jill Pryor, Coogler (N.D. Ala.)), the Court vacated Mr. Steiger's sentence and remanded for resentencing. 

Mr. Steiger appealed his sentence of 20 years' imprisonment following the revocation of his probation.  The Guidelines recommended a sentence of 12 to 18 months imprisonment. 

The Court vacated and remanded for resentencing because the district court did not give any reason for why it was imposing an above-guideline sentence, as required by § 3553(c)(2) and United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2016).  The Court reiterated that it had adopted a per se rule of reversal for   §3553(c)(2) errors.  Thus, because the district court's statements at sentencing were not sufficiently specific to allow the Court to understand why it imposed an above-guideline sentence, the Court vacated and remanded.  The Court rejected the government's suggestion that it look at the context and record from the entire revocation proceeding to glean the reasoning for the sentence imposed.  

Chief Judge William Pryor concurred, but urged the Court to rehear the case en banc to reconsider Parks, which requires a per se rule of reversal for  § 3553(c)(2) errors even when a defendant fails to object to the explanation of his sentence before the district court.  In his view,  § 3553(c) challenges should be treated like all other procedural sentencing challenges, which are reviewed for plain error when a defendant fails to object in the district court.