Robinson: Vacating Contempt Conviction for Violating a Civil Injunction

In United States v. Robinson, No. 22-10949 (Sept. 28, 2023) (Jordan, Rosenbaum, Newsom), the Court vacated the defendant’s contempt conviction for violating a civil injunction against a stun-gun company.

The Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient that the defendant was bound by the injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Most notably, the Court declined to consider whether the defendant was liable under an aiding and abetting theory because the government failed to pursue that theory in the district court. And, relying on recent Supreme Court decisions in Percoco and Ciminelli, as well as fair-notice principles, the Court concluded that it could not affirm on a ground that the government did not advance in the district court, a rule that applied equally to bench trials as well as jury trials.

Jones: No Jurisdiction to Address Second 2255 Challenging 3559 Residual Clause Based on Johnson/Davis

In Jones v. United States, No. 20-13365 (Sept. 14, 2023) (Wilson, Luck, Lagoa), the Court directed the district court to dismiss a second 2255 motion for lack of jurisdiction.

Jones filed a 2255 motion to vacate his mandatory life sentence under 3559, arguing that its residual clause was unconstitutionally vague in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson, Dimaya, and Davis. On appeal, the government agreed that 3559’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague and that Jones was otherwise entitled to relief. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit appointed an amicus to defend the district court’s ruling. Although not even the amicus raised this argument, the Eleventh Circuit sua sponte concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction because Jones could not satisfy the gatekeeping requirement in 2255(h)(2) for a second 2255 motion. The reason was that, although the Supreme Court had declared numerous other similar residual clauses unconstitutional, there was no Supreme Court decision specifically declaring 3559’s residual clause unconstitutional.

Judge Wilson dissented, arguing that Jones was relying on the same rule of law announced in Johnson, as well as Dimaya and Davis, since that rule was not limited to the specific residual clauses struck down in those cases. He said that the majority’s conclusion was “alarming” because, despite the Supreme Court’s clear guidance, prisoners like Jones serving mandatory life sentences will have no way to vindicate their rights unless the Supreme Court takes up a 3559 case, something that might not arise given the government’s agreement that 3559 is unconstitutional.

Graham: No Prejudice from Grand Jury Meeting in Separate Courthouses During COVID

In United States v. Graham, No. 22-11809 (Grant, Tjoflat, Ed Carnes) (Sept. 8, 2023), the Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction (and granted the government’s motion to publish this previously-unpublished opinion).

The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment because, pursuant to the Southern District of Georgia’s covid protocols in place during the summer of 2020, the grand jury met in three different courthouses and was connected by videoconference. The Eleventh Circuit held that, even if the grand jurors were required to be present in the same room (a question it did not decide), the defendant made no effort to show prejudice, which he was required to do.

The Court also held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the affidavit in support of a wiretap adequately explained why alternative investigative procedures were insufficient.

Talley: Fugitive Status Does Not Toll Period of Supervised Release

In United States v. Talley, No. 22-13921 (Sept. 7, 2023) (Wilson, Grant, Brasher), the Court vacated the district court’s judgment revoking supervised release.

The defendant committed the supervised release violation after the term of supervision had lapsed but while he was a fugitive from justice. The Court held that the district court erred in tolling the period of supervised release based on his fugitive status for absconding from supervision. The Court reasoned that the fugitive tolling doctrine, which applies in the context of sentences of imprisonment, did not apply in the context of supervised release. And the Court reasoned that the statutory text contemplated only two circumstances where a term of supervision may be tolled, neither of which related to fugitive status. In so holding, the Court joined the First Circuit and parted ways with three other circuits.