The Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. As for attempting to use a WMD, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that the government was required to prove a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. Instead, the Court concluded that, because this element went only to jurisdiction, the government was required to prove only a minimal effect on interstate commerce. And the government met that low bar because a witness testified about how a terrorist attack would have affected tourism. As for attempting to provide material support to ISIS, the Court found the evidence sufficient even though the defendant coordinated only with government informants and undercover officers, because he had the requisite intent to coordinate with and direct his services to ISIS, and he took substantial steps to do so.
As for the sentence, the Court first found no plain Eighth Amendment error. The defendant was 24 years old, not a juvenile, and attempted to kill as many people as possible by detonating a bomb. The Court next found no plain error with respect to the guideline calculations, rejecting the defendant's double-counting argument. The fact that the base offense level and a "terrorism" enhancement were triggered by the same conduct did not constitute double-counting, because the two guidelines served different sentencing considerations and harms: one addressed the attempted use of dangerous materials with intent to injure the US or to aid a foreign entity, while the other addressed actions intended to influence or affect the government through intimidation or coercion. Finally, the Court found the guideline sentence of life to be substantively reasonable, emphasizing that the district court properly considered what would have happened had the attempt offenses been completed.