Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals - Published Opinions

Wednesday, March 15, 2006

Brown: Shoeless suspect not in custody

In U.S. v. Brown, No. 04-10325 (March 13, 2006), the Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence for a defendant convicted of a 2002 murder of a postmistress in Fleming, Georgia.
The Court rejected Brown’s argument that his first confession was given to police in violation of his Miranda rights. The Court found that during interrogation Brown was repeatedly told he was free to leave at any time, and that the police officers who asked him questions were not armed. Consequently, Brown was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes, and his rights therefore were not violated. The Court recognized that the police confiscated Brown’s only pair of sneakers (a footprint was found at the crime scene), but noted he could still have gone outside barefoot, and, more importantly, could simply have not talked to the police.
The Court also rejected the argument that the district court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing on whether the police were "unduly suggestive" in obtaining eye-witness testimony concerning photo lineups. The Court found any error harmless in light of the other "overwhelming" evidence against Brown.
The Court also found no error in the district court’s ruling that at the sentencing phase Brown could not introduce the testimony of the victim’s relative that opposed the imposition of the death penalty. Such testimony would invade the province of the jury in deciding Brown’s fate.
The Court also rejected Brown’s challenge to a Magistrate Judge’s ruling which quashed one of his subpoenas. The Court noted that by failing to appeal this ruling to the district judge, Brown waived the argument.
The Court also rejected the argument that the empaneling of a death-qualified jury deprived Brown of a fair jury in the guilt-innocence phase, noting that this argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Lockhart v. McCree.
The Court also rejected Brown’s challenge to the district court’s statements during voir dire (not objected to contemporaneously) regarding the burden of proof at sentencing. Though recognizing that some statements were "inartfully worded," the error did not prejudice Brown, because the judge gave correct instructions at the conclusion of the sentencing phase.
The Court found no error in the district court’s dismissal of one juror "for cause" in light of the juror’s "equivocating" answers during voir dire regarding her willingness to impose the death penalty.
No reversible error was found in the district court’s "slip of the tongue" in telling one juror that Brown had pled guilty, in view of the correct jury instructions at the conclusion of the trial.
No hearsay or Crawford error was found in the admission, at the sentencing phase, of testimony about the family’s grieving after the victim’s death. The Court pointed out that the statements were not "testimonial," and therefore not subject to exclusion under Crawford, and that it was even unclear whether the statements were "hearsay."
The Court also rejected Brown’s argument that the photos of the victim taken after the murder were unfairly prejudicial because they showed blood which would have become evident only after he left the scene of the crime and the body was moved by attempted rescuers. The Court noted that the blood resulted from Brown’s decision to stab the victim "repeatedly."
The Court found no error in the district court’s refusal to authorize funds to pay for a social worker witness regarding Brown’s social history. Noting Brown’s "coherent" presentation on this topic at trial with the witnesses for which funding was provided.
The Court further rejected the argument that a "pecuniary gain" aggravating factor can only arise in a murder for hire case, not as here, when robbery was the motive.
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing regarding the reconstruction of transcripts of alleged ex parte proceedings involving the district court and relating to his requests for funds to aid in his defense. The Court noted that Brown did not follow the procedure of making a proffer of the unrecorded content of the communications.