In United States v. Jones et al., No. 19-11505 (June
16, 2020) (William Pryor, Grant, Jung (MD Fla)), the Court addressed
eligibility for relief under Section 404 of the First Step Act in the context
of four defendants, and it ultimately affirmed two orders denying relief and
vacated two orders denying relief.
The Court determined that anyone sentenced under 841(b)(1)(A)(iii)
or (b)(1)(B)(iii) has a “covered offense.”
It explained: “To determine the offense for which the district court
imposed a sentence, district courts must consult the record, including the
movant’s charging document, the jury verdict or guilty plea, the sentencing
record, and the final judgment.” Although
the Court rejected the “statute of conviction” interpretation of several other
circuits, it understood that its interpretation ultimately “arrived at the same
end result.” It rejected the government’s
argument that a defendant’s specific drug quantity affected whether he had a “covered
offense.”
However, at the same time, the Court the concluded that
courts may still lack authority under 404(b) to reduce a sentence for a “covered
offense.” The Court concluded that a
district court is bound by the drug quantity used at sentencing to determine
the defendant’s statutory penalties, even if that quantity had been found only
by a judge. And if the statutory range
would remain the same based on that drug-quantity finding, the court lacks
authority to reduce the sentence. In
effect then, the Court appears to have adopted the government’s conduct-based
interpretation to eligibility, but did so under 404(b) rather than 404(a).
Based on those legal determinations, the Court concluded
that all four defendants had “covered offenses” because they were originally
sentenced under 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) or (b)(1)(A)(iii). However, it nonetheless affirmed two orders
denying relief because the judge-found quantity used at sentencing exceeded the
increased thresholds under the Fair Sentencing Act. The Court vacated two orders because the drug
quantity used at sentencing was based on the jury verdict, and thus did not
exceed the increased FSA thresholds.
However, because it was not clear whether the district court understood
that it had authority to reduce their sentences, the Court vacated those two orders and remanded.
