In United States v. Sanchez, No. 18-10711 (Oct. 2,
2019) (Hull, Rosenbaum, Grant), the Court affirmed the defendant's ACCA
sentence based on New York first-degree robbery and New York second-degree murder.
As an initial matter, the Court synthesized recent decisions
about the elements clause and explained that "physical force" means:
1) an act that is exerted by and through concrete bodies; and 2) that is
directly or indirectly "capable" of causing pain or injury, in that
it has the potential to do so. Applying
that standard, and agreeing with the Second and Fourth Circuits, the Court held
that New York robbery satisfied the elements clause because it requires
forcible stealing, which requires the defendant to use or threaten the
immediate use of physical force. The New
York definition of forcible stealing largely tracked the elements clause and
adopted the common law understanding of robbery, and it did not include
robberies that could be committed by only a slight touching (like sudden
snatching). The Court found that Stokeling
foreclosed the defendant's argument that robbery by blocking the victim did not
satisfy the elements clause.
Second, the Court held that New York second-degree murder
satisfied the elements clause because it required the intent to cause death to
another person. Relying on Castleman
and Vail-Bailon, the Court reasoned that the intentional causation of
bodily harm (or death) necessarily requires force "capable" of
causing such harm. The Court rejected the
defendant's argument that murder by poison did not satisfy the elements clause,
as that argument was foreclosed by the Court's precedents. And the Court rejected the defendant's
argument that murder did not qualify because it could be committed by
omission. As a matter of state law, the
Court found that failing to act where there is a duty to act constitutes an act
or conduct itself, not an omission. And
intentionally withholding medical treatment or food would constitute indirect
force satisfying the elements clause for the same reason as poisoning.
Finally, the Court rejected, on plain error, the statutory
argument that the ACCA applies only when the defendant is convicted of 922(g)
and another offense.
