Applying the four Barker v. Wingo factors, the Court first found no speedy trial violation stemming from the five-year delay between his indictment and arrest. Focusing on the disputed second factor, the Court concluded that the government made good-faith, diligent efforts to locate and arrest the defendant after he left the country for Brazil without telling the agent. The agent visited his home and left a business card, spoke to the defendant and his wife, and periodically checked databases, and the defendant periodically returned to the US under an alias, lived at a different address, and never informed the agent. The government was not required to seek extradition in this particular case despite the existence of a treaty. Because all three of the factors did not weigh heavily in the defendant's favor, he was required to show actual prejudice from the delay, and the Court found no such prejudice from his conclusory and speculative inability to locate non-specified persons and records.
Next, the Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions because he had the requisite intent to defraud. He made material misstatements on loan applications, and there was sufficient evidence that the defendant knew what he was signing even though he was a non-English speaker, including the facts that his English-speaking wife was present and the financial figures were wildly inconsistent with his means.
The Court next concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding defense evidence of a federal indictment against the mortgage agent. That indictment was irrelevant to the current charges because the agent was not a witness or co-defendant in the present case, the charges against him were wholly unrelated to the current charges, the charges involved personal loans that the agent sought for himself not someone else, and the charges against him post-dated the charged offense. And, in any event, the Court noted that an indictment alone was not evidence of the agent's guilt and was thus likely to confuse the jury.
Despite affirming the convictions, the Court nonetheless vacated the defendant's sentence because the district court plainly erred by failing to afford him the right to allocute. Although the district court asked defense counsel if the defendant wished to make a statement, the court failed to address the defendant personally. And it was no excuse that the defendant was using an interpreter. Because the defendant did not receive the lowest possible sentence, the Court presumed prejudice and vacated the sentence and remanded for allocution.
