Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals - Published Opinions

Tuesday, January 11, 2005

Highway travel is Interstate Commerce

In U.S. v. Ballinger, No. 01-14872 (Jan. 10, 2005), the Court (en banc) held that 18 U.S.C. § 247, which criminalizes destruction of religious property on account of its religious character, is not an invalid exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Ballinger was an arsonist who travelled on the interstate highways through 4 States for no other purpose than to burn churches to the ground. Eleven churches in 4 States were destroyed during the arson spree.
The Court found that it need not reach the issue whether the conviction was valid under Congress' Commerce Clause power to regulate intrastate activities which substantially affect interstate commerce, because the statute fell squarely within the other aspects of the Commerce Clause power, namely the power to regulate channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce. The Court rejected the argument that arson is purely local activity, pointing out that Ballinger used the interstate highways, and that Congress can prohibit the use of interstate channels or instrumentalities to promote the "spread of any evil" from State to State. The Court pointed out that travel from State to State was essential to Ballinger’s crime. The Court pointed out that the statute contained a jurisdictional requirement that an arson affect interstate commerce, and that the statute therefore did not merely bar local intrastate arson.
The Court rejected the argument that interstate travel before the arson was irrelevant to the question of whether the arson was connected to interstate commerce. The Court construed the "in commerce" language of the statute’s jurisdictional requirement to refer to the use of the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce. The Court stated that the "in commerce" language reaches less commerce than "affecting commerce" language. But the Court found that the "in commerce" language covered the act of traveling interstate to commit arson. The Court pointed out that similarly-worded statutes prohibiting firearm possession had been upheld even though the only jurisdictional nexus was that the gun had at some point in time travelled interstate.