Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals - Published Opinions

Thursday, March 25, 2010

Sneed: Precluding Police Reports as Source for 924(e) Temporality Findings

In U.S. v. Sneed, No. 09-13195 (March 24, 2010), the Court vacated the 15-year minimum mandatory sentence imposed, based on his three prior convictions, on a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

Section 924(e) provides for a sentence enhancement if the defendant committed three prior qualifying felonies on occasions different from one another. The district court, over Sneed’s objection, found that the three prior felonies were committed on different occasions – based only on police reports.

On appeal, the Court recognized that U.S. v. Richardson, 230 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2000), held that a sentencing court could consider police reports for purposes of determining whether three prior qualifying felonies were committed on occasions different from one another. The Court determined that Richardson had effectively been abrogated by Shephard v. U.S., 544 U.S. 13 (2005).

The Court noted that Shephard precluded reliance on police reports to establish the nature of a prior conviction for purposes of the § 924(e) enhancement. The Court recognized that Shepard thus addressed the nature of prior convictions, not, as in Richardson, whether the prior convictions were temporally separate. However, noting Shephard’s Sixth Amendment concerns, the Court found “simply no distinction” between the two inquiries. It held that police reports are not Shephard-approved sources for § 924(e) findings with respect to whether offenses were committed on different occasions.

The Court vacated Sneed’s sentence and remanded for resentencing without the § 924(e) enhancement.

Monday, March 22, 2010

Ramunno: No Constructive Trust for Victim of Ponzi Scheme

In U.S. v. Ramunno, No. 09-10446 (March 17, 2010), the Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of a fraud-victim’s request to amend an order of forfeiture against the defendant and recognize a “constructive trust” under Georgia state law in the amount of funds the victim invested. The Court pointed out that the claimant was just one of a number of victims of Ramunno’s Ponzi scheme, and that if he were granted a constructive trust to recoup his entire loss, the pool of funds available to distribute to Ramunno’s other victims through the Attorney General’s remission process would be reduced. “If the funds are distributed equitably to all victims, then each victim . . . may recover some fraction of their lost investments.”

Thursday, March 18, 2010

Jennings: Workers' Comp. Fraud Conviction Upheld

In U.S. v. Jennings, No. 08-13434 (March 16, 2010), the Court affirmed convictions and sentences arising out of a scheme to sell fraudulent workers’ compensation insurance.

The Court rejected the defendant’s challenge to the reliance by the government’s expert on hearsay evidence. The Court found that the hearsay was based on “general practice in the field” regarding industry requirements, “gleaned from years of working within the industry and its professionals.”

The Court found that a witness’ testimony about parallel civil litigation was too fleeting to overturn the district court’s denial of a mistrial.

The Court declined to find that treating the receipts instead of the profits as the subject of money laundering constituted plain error under the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. Santos. The fragmented opinions in that case yielded a precedent limited only to money laundering in unlicensed gambling cases – which this case was not.

The Court rejected a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, citing the district court’s finding that the defendant “defrauded his victims of their rightful benefits out of sheer greed and in doing so caused great suffering.”

Frank: Un-Mirandized Statement to Cambodian Police Is Admissible

In U.S. v. Frank, No. 07-13685 (March 15, 2010), the Court affirmed convictions for traveling to Cambodia and engaging in illicit sexual conduct with minor children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(b) and 2251A(b)(2)(A).

The Court rejected Frank’s argument that his un-Mirandized statements to Cambodian police in Cambodia should have been suppressed. The Court noted that Miranda only applies in a foreign country if American officials are involved in the questioning or if the questioning shocks the judicial conscience; here, American officials played no role in Frank’s questioning. Moreover, Frank’s questioning did not shock the judicial conscience.

The Court also rejected Frank’s challenge to the extraterritorial application of § 2251A. The Court found that Congress intended to apply this statute extraterritorially, because it criminalized conduct by a person who “travels in foreign commerce” and engages in any illicit sexual conduct.

The Court rejected the argument that Frank was not guilty of the “purchase” of a minor for the purpose of producing a sexually explicit visual depiction, because he paid the minors directly, not a third-party. “In the context of child prostitution, the minor herself is turned into an object or commodity, by selling her body to be used by the defendant for a certain purpose.”

The Court found that the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant in closing as a “shark” was not improper because it was responding to the defense characterization of the defendant as a “dolphin.”

Turning to sentencing, the Court found no plain error in imposing multiple sentences for both traveling to Cambodia and engaging in illicit sexual conduct, even though all the criminal activity happened during one single trip.

Thursday, March 11, 2010

Davis: Pre-Gant Caselaw Excuses Unlawful Search

In U.S. v. Davis, No. 08-16654 (March 11, 2010), recognizing a Circuit split on this issue, the Court held that even though the police search of a vehicle was unreasonable under Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), the fruits of the search need not be suppressed, because the police were relying in good faith on pre-Gant precedent which authorized their search.

The Court first held that the constitutionality of a search, and the applicability of the exclusionary rule to suppress the fruits of the search, are separate questions. The application of the exclusionary rule is subject to the “good faith exception.” The Court emphasized that pre-Gant law was clear, and “unambiguously” authorized the search in this case. Consequently, the Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule.

Ternus: Stolen paintings conviction upheld

In U.S. v. Ternus, No. 07-14708 (March 2, 2010), the Court affirmed Ternus’ conviction for conspiracy to transport in interstate commerce stolen goods, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2314. The case involved four paintings stolen from a museum in Nice, France.

The Court rejected the argument that there was insufficient evidence that Ternus intended to transport the paintings in foreign commerce. The Court noted that Ternus pled guilty to the charge, including its jurisdictional element.

The Court also rejected the argument that the district court erred in accepting his guilty plea because of the lack of evidence on the jurisdictional element, pointing out that Ternus’ plan was for the paintings were to be brought to the United States.

Williams: Counsel not ineffective for failing to call psychopharmacologist

In Williams v. Allen, No. 08-11905 (March 4, 2010), the Court denied habeas relief to an Alabama death row inmate convicted of two murders in 1992.

The Court rejected Williams’ argument that his counsel was ineffective for pursuing an insanity defense. It was a “sound strategic decision.”

The Court also rejected Williams’ claim that counsel failed to adequately investigate an intoxication defense. The Court found that even had a psychopharmacologist been called as a witness by the defense, the jury could have concluded that the murders were purposeful, and therefore deserving of the death penalty.

Finally, the Court rejected the argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to burden-shifting jury instructions. The Court found that the jury was instructed to presume sanity, not intent.

Culver: 720-month sentence for child pornographer

In U.S. v. Culver, No. 07_14708 (March 2, 2010), the Court affirmed the conviction and 720-month sentence imposed on a defendant convicted of producing child pornography of his stepdaughter.

The Court rejected the argument that the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to criminalize Culver’s conduct, pointing out that “pornography begets pornography, regardless of its origin.”

The Court also rejected Culver’s Rule 404(b) challenge to admission of evidence that he used a stun gun against his stepdaughter, pointing out that this evidence was relevant to show that he rendered her unconscious to make the tape of her.

The Court also affirmed the exclusion of evidence of the victim’s prior sexual history. The Court found that Culver was given adequate opportunity to question the victim on cross-examination.

Turning to sentencing, the Court found it not unreasonable for the sentencing court to have increased Culver’s sentence based on findings that he drugged and shocked the victim, despite a State jury’s acquittal of Culver on these charges. The Court noted that a sentencing court can rely on acquitted conduct.

Wednesday, March 10, 2010

Rozier: Felon in Possession Crime is Constitutional

In U.S. v. Rozier, No. 08-17061 (March 4, 2010), the Court rejected the argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which criminalizes a felon’s possession of a firearm, is unconstitutional in light of the right to bear arms recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008). The Court noted that Heller stated that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”

Separately, the Court reaffirmed that life is the statutory maximum for violators of § 922(g)(1) how have been previously convicted of at least three serious drug offenses.

Tuesday, March 09, 2010

Brummer: Firearm forfeiture Mandatory

In U.S. v. Brummer, No. 09-13613 (March 8, 2010), the Court held that forfeiture of firearms or ammunition is mandatory for defendants convicted of knowingly and willfully failing to declare firearms to a common carrier, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e). The Court relied on the plain language of the statute, specifically its use of the word “shall” with reference to the order of forfeiture.

Bacon: Individually Attributable Quantities Only Trigger Mandatory Minimum

In U.S. v. Bacon, No. 08-10463 (March 4, 2010), the Court affirmed multi-defendant drug trafficking convictions, but vacated one sentence.

The Court rejected sufficiency of the evidence challenges, noting that the jury could rely on a defendant’s presence at a drug exchange as probative evidence.

Turning to sentencing, the Court found plain error in the district court’s failure to determine whether one defendant qualified for a mandatory minimum sentence based only on the quantity of drugs individually attributable to him.

Monday, March 08, 2010

Dodge: Transfer of sex materials to minor qualifies for sex offender registration

In U.S. v. Dodge, No. 08-10802 (March 5, 2010) (en banc), the Court held that a conviction for transferring obscene material to a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470 qualifies as a “specified offense against a minor” and therefore subjects a sex offender to SORNA registration requirements.

The Court rejected the argument that the statute by implication excluded his offense from the list of qualifying offenses, noting the “broad purpose and scope of SORNA.”

The Court held that, in determining whether an offense met the SORNA definition, courts could look to the underlying conduct, not just to the elements of the offense. Here, Dodge evinced his intent that a thirteen-year old girl view him in a sexual state. This conduct qualified as a criminal offense against a minor.

Tuesday, March 02, 2010

DuBose: Protective Order Sufficed to Establish 922(g)(8) violation

In U.S. v. DuBose, No. 09-11400 (March 1, 2010), the Court affirmed a defendant’s conviction for possessing a firearm while subject to a protective order, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).

The Court rejected the argument that DuBose’s protective order did not meet the statute’s requirement that it involve preventing the use of physical force. The Court pointed out that the protective order enjoined DuBose from “hurting” his wife.

The Court also rejected DuBose’s attempt to challenge the validity of the Alabama protective order under Alabama. Pointing out that the Supreme Court foreclosed collateral attacks on prior felony convictions in felon in possession cases in Lewis v. United States, the Court applied the same rule to underlying protective orders in § 922(g)(8) prosecutions.

Friday, February 26, 2010

Whitson: Non-overt act conspiracy not "crime of violence"

In U.S. v. Whitson, No. 09-10521 (Feb. 24, 2010), applying Begay v. U.S., the Court held that a prior conviction for a non-overt act conspiracy was not a “crime of violence” for purposes of Career Offender eligibility under USSG § 4B1.1

The Court noted that the South Carolina conspiracy statute under which Whitson was previously convicted does not require an overt act. Further, the “agreement” that constitutes a conspiracy is not, without more, violent or aggressive. The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit’s contrary holding that a conspiracy cannot be divorced from its violent objective, and that a conspiracy increases the likelihood of violence. The Court held that Begay requires looking at the conspiracy “alone” to determine whether the conspiracy was “violent.” “Seeing no violence or aggression in the act of agreement,” the Court concluded that it did not qualify as a “crime of violence.”

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Phillips: Rule 35(a) deadline applies to 3582(c)(2) resentencings

In U.S. v. Phillips, No. 08-17248 (Feb. 23, 2010), the Court held that the seven-day deadline for correction of sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) [now 14-days, as of Dec. 1, 2009] applies to sentences imposed in response to a motion to reduce sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Because the 7-day deadline is jurisdictional, the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider the government’s motion for reconsideration, which was filed more than 7-days after the court resentenced the defendant under § 3582(c)(2). Consequently, the Court vacated the amended sentence and remanded the case with instructions to reimpose the originally (defense-favorable, though legally incorrect) § 3582(c)(2) sentence.

The Court rejected the government’s argument that Rule 35(a) did not apply to § 3582(c)(2) resentencings. The Court noted that while § 3582(c)(2) proceedings are not the same as the original sentencing, the court is still “sentencing.” Further, § 3582 expressly prohibits modification of sentence after it is entered except under specified conditions – not present in this case.

Wednesday, February 17, 2010

Duran: Suitcase Scandal Foreign Agent Conviction Affirmed

In United States v. Duran, No. 09-11446 (Feb. 16, 2010), the Court affirmed the convictions of a Venezuelan citizen for acting as an agent of a foreign organization, without prior notification of the Attorney General, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951.

The case arose out of the “Suitcase Scandal” involving the seizure of $800,000 in cash from a Venezuelan entering Argentina, cash intended, it was speculated, for the presidential candidate Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Duran, acting on behalf of Venezuela, had meetings in Miami in an effort to conceal responsibility for the $800,000.

The Court rejected Duran’s argument that the government had to prove that he had knowledge of the foreign agent registration requirement. The failure to register offense is a general intent offense, which does not require proof of actual knowledge. The Court also rejected the argument that the statute only punishes conduct that related to espionage, pointing out that the registration requirement applies regardless of the activity at issue, so long as it is on behalf of a foreign government.

The Court rejected the argument that Duran should have been allowed to present evidence of his ignorance of the registration requirement, because knowledge of the requirement is not an element of the offense.

The Court also rejected Duran’s argument that statements showing his lack of intent to act as an agent of Venezuela should have been admitted, finding them not sufficiently probative to constitute reversible error.

The Court rejected Duran’s 404(b) challenge to the admission of evidence of his giving kickbacks to Venezuelan government, finding that the evidence showed Duran’s intent and motive. Further, the evidence was subject to a limiting instruction. In addition, the evidence was admissible to rebut Duran’s entrapment defense.

Tuesday, February 09, 2010

Arnold: Granting Habeas Relief based on Brady violation

In Arnold v. Sec. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 09-11911 (Feb. 8, 2010), the Court adopted the opinion of the district court in the Middle District of Florida granting habeas relief to a Florida inmate who alleged a Brady violation based on undisclosed criminal activity by the police officer who was a primary investigator in his own case.

The district court opinion found no procedural default: it recognized that Arnold’s federal petition “slightly expanded” upon his post-conviction state claims, but the two were “the same Brady claim.”

The opinion rejected the State’s argument that, since the prosecution itself was, like Arnold, unaware of the police officer’s corrupt activities, it could not deemed to have “suppressed” this evidence. The opinion noted that the police officer was part of the “prosecution team,” and therefore his own concealment of his activities sufficed for purposes of establishing a Brady violation. Moreover, impeachment of the police officer based on his activities could have changed the outcome of the trial, because the officer testified against Arnold and provided vital identification testimony. The opinion rejected the argument that the impeachment evidence would not have been admissible, pointing out that it might actually have been unnecessary given the State’s admission that, had it known of the police officer’s activities, it would not have called him as a witness.

Patterson: Intended Loss Measured by Defendant's "Ambition"

In U.S. v. Patterson, No. 09-13354 (Feb. 8, 2010), the Court found no plain error in a calculation of “loss” for sentencing enhancement purposes under the Guidelines that resulted in dollar amount twice as large as the amount of restitution.

The Court noted that “loss” encompasses “actual loss,” or “intended loss,” whichever is greater. In calculating “intended loss,” the sentencing court uses the “reasonable mathematical limit” of an offender’s scheme; “A criminal pays the price for the ambition of his acts, not their thoroughness.” “Restitution, on the other hand, must be based on the amount of loss actually caused by the defendant’s conduct.” Consequently, the law does not require “a simple symmetry between loss and restitution.”

The Court declined to reach Patterson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on the failure to object to the sentence, noting that § 2255 is the “preferred means” for bringing such claims.

Friday, February 05, 2010

Green: Counsel Ineffective, But not prejudicially so

In Green v. Nelson, No. 08-11212 (Feb. 4, 2010), the Court granted partial habeas relief to a Georgia inmate convicted of aggravated sodomy and rape.

The Court agreed with Green that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress blood and DNA evidence on the ground that this evidence was obtained based on a false affidavit. The affidavit did contain materially false information; trial counsel did not make a strategic decision not to suppress the evidence, but failed to realize that the affidavit was false. However, the ineffectiveness did not prejudice Green, because other correct information in the affidavit would have sufficed to establish probable cause for the search for blood and DNA evidence.

Turning to the sufficiency of the evidence of the aggravated sodomy, the Court agreed with Green that there was insufficient evidence to support this conviction. Green was charged with having placed his penis in the anus of his victim. However, the Court found no evidence of this contact.

Holmes: Sufficient 1028A evidence

In U.S. v. Holmes, No. 09-14035 (Feb. 4, 2010), the Court rejected a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to a conviction of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence that she knew that Julie Ann Overton, the person whose identity Holmes fraudulently used, was an “actual person.”

The Court noted that the government presented evidence of the rigorous identification processes to which the personal information Holmes submitted about Overton was subjected. Holmes’ willingness to subject the personal information to such scrutiny established that Holmes knew, all along, that the information belonged to a real person. Further, Holmes would have known Overton’s actual existence from the repeated successful use of her personal information to obtain a passport, a driver’s licence, and identification cards.