In U.S. v. Dorsey, No. 06-16698 (Aug. 31, 2007), the Court vacated a sentence based on the defendant’s claim that the government vindictively refused to file a USSG § 5K1.1 motion for reduction of sentence because he went to trial.
After his arrest, Dorsey provided information to law enforcement which immediately led to the arrest of a cocaine-trafficking accomplice. The government then promised him a 5K1.1 departure if he pled guilty. Dorsey elected to go to trial. He was convicted. The government then declined to move for a 5K1.1 departure, claiming that the assistance was "minimal" and that Dorsey started dealing drugs again.
The Court held that a vindictive refusal by the government to move for a 5K1.1 reduction based on a defendant’s exercise of his right to jury trial could be an unconstitutional motive. However, the defendant bears the burden of proving prosecutorial vindictiveness. In some cases, a defendant may rely on a presumption of vindictiveness, which can then be rebutted. In this case, the government had rebutted the presumption, by claiming that the assistance was minimal, and that Dorsey started dealing drugs again, thus proffering legitimate reasons for its failure to file a 5K1.1 motion.
Dorsey therefore had to establish actual vindictiveness. This would require more than showing that the government carried out a threat not to move for a 5K1.1 unless the defendant pled guilty. Because the record was not clear why the government failed to move for a § 5K1.1, the Court remanded the case to the district court for fact-finding at a new sentencing hearing.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals - Published Opinions
Friday, August 31, 2007
Agbai: Cookie-cutter sentence ok
In U.S. v. Agbai, No. 06-15691 (Aug. 31, 2007), the Court affirmed the imposition of a 41-month sentence on a defendant convicted of use of a counterfeit device in connection with credit card fraud.
The Court rejected the argument that the district court erred when it treated the guidelines as "presumptively reasonable." Noting that Rita v. U.S., 127 S.Ct. 2456 (2007) stated that when a judge decides to follow the Guidelines in a particular case, and when the defendant does not argue that this Guideline is unsound generally, a lengthy explanation is not required.
The Court also rejected the argument that the 41-month sentence was unreasonable, noting the district court’s finding that Agbai’s offense presented a "cookie-cutter case."
The Court rejected the argument that the district court erred when it treated the guidelines as "presumptively reasonable." Noting that Rita v. U.S., 127 S.Ct. 2456 (2007) stated that when a judge decides to follow the Guidelines in a particular case, and when the defendant does not argue that this Guideline is unsound generally, a lengthy explanation is not required.
The Court also rejected the argument that the 41-month sentence was unreasonable, noting the district court’s finding that Agbai’s offense presented a "cookie-cutter case."
Wednesday, August 29, 2007
Taber: Use of Minor Enhancement
In U.S. v. Taber, No. 07-10973 (Aug. 29, 2007), the Court affirmed the imposition of a two-level sentence enhancement under USSG § 3B1.4 for use of a minor in the commission his theft of firearms.
USSG § 3B1.4 provides for a sentence enhancement if the defendant used a person less than 18 years old to commit the offense. The Court recognized that in this case the minor devised the crime, and invited Tabor to participate in the theft of firearms. Nonetheless, it rejected the argument that the § 3B1.4 enhancement should not apply. The Court found that Taber took affirmative acts to involve the minor, by encouraging and helping the minor steal the firearms. These subsequent affirmative acts warranted the § 3B1.4 enhancement.
USSG § 3B1.4 provides for a sentence enhancement if the defendant used a person less than 18 years old to commit the offense. The Court recognized that in this case the minor devised the crime, and invited Tabor to participate in the theft of firearms. Nonetheless, it rejected the argument that the § 3B1.4 enhancement should not apply. The Court found that Taber took affirmative acts to involve the minor, by encouraging and helping the minor steal the firearms. These subsequent affirmative acts warranted the § 3B1.4 enhancement.
Monday, August 27, 2007
Gordon: No ineffectiveness in failing to object to non-allocution
In Gordon v. U.S., No. 05-16703 (Aug. 23, 2007), the Court denied habeas relief to a federal inmate who claimed that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the district court’s failure to inform him of the charges to which he was pleading, and failure to address the defendant personally regarding his right to allocute.
The Court assumed that the district court erred when it did not advise Gordon of the charges to which he was pleading, but denied relief because this error did not affect Gordon’s substantial rights. The record showed that both defense counsel and the prosecutor had explained the charges to Gordon.
Because defense counsel might reasonably have decided, for strategic reasons, not to object to the absence of inquiry about Gordon’s right to allocute – because Gordon would have seemed even "less honest" if he had addressed the court – the Court found no ineffectiveness here as well.
The Court assumed that the district court erred when it did not advise Gordon of the charges to which he was pleading, but denied relief because this error did not affect Gordon’s substantial rights. The record showed that both defense counsel and the prosecutor had explained the charges to Gordon.
Because defense counsel might reasonably have decided, for strategic reasons, not to object to the absence of inquiry about Gordon’s right to allocute – because Gordon would have seemed even "less honest" if he had addressed the court – the Court found no ineffectiveness here as well.
Thursday, August 23, 2007
Jones: No Unequivocal Request to Proceed Pro Se
In Jones v. Walker, No. 04-13562 (Aug. 27, 2007), the Court granted habeas relief to a Georgia state inmate on the ground that the state erroneously deprived him of the right to counsel in circumstances where the defendant, though unhappy with his trial counsel, had not unequivocally assert a desire to waive counsel and to represent himself, yet was ordered to proceed pro se. The Court found that the state courts erroneously found that trial counsel had advised the defendant of the "dangers" of self-representation, when in fact she had not. The Court further found that the defendant’s complaints about the incompetence of his court-appointed lawyer did not amount to a clear and unequivocal request to proceed pro se. The Count noted that the legal standard governing this issue is now before it en banc in U.S. v. Garey.
Monday, August 13, 2007
Mattern: Habeas Claim not Moot re: prior conviction
In Mattern v. Sec. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 05-15161 (Aug. 7, 2007), the Court reversed the denial of a habeas petition by a state inmate.
After being convicted for aggravated battery, and being sentenced to probation, Mattern’s probation was revoked. At his probation revocation hearing he argued, correctly, that his prior conviction should have been for simple battery, not aggravated battery. This argument failed, and, after exhausting his state post-conviction remedies, he brought this claim in a federal habeas proceeding. By then, he had been released from incarceration – but arrested on another battery charge, for which the prior aggravating battery conviction would increase his potential sentence. The district court dismissed the petition on mootness grounds.
Reversing, the Court noted that because Mattern had been arrested at the time he brought his federal habeas claim, and the prior conviction was used to enhance his punishment for this latest crime, his challenge to this conviction was not moot.
The Court noted the remaining question of whether Mattern had exercised due diligence in timely asserting his challenge to the prior aggravated battery conviction, and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
After being convicted for aggravated battery, and being sentenced to probation, Mattern’s probation was revoked. At his probation revocation hearing he argued, correctly, that his prior conviction should have been for simple battery, not aggravated battery. This argument failed, and, after exhausting his state post-conviction remedies, he brought this claim in a federal habeas proceeding. By then, he had been released from incarceration – but arrested on another battery charge, for which the prior aggravating battery conviction would increase his potential sentence. The district court dismissed the petition on mootness grounds.
Reversing, the Court noted that because Mattern had been arrested at the time he brought his federal habeas claim, and the prior conviction was used to enhance his punishment for this latest crime, his challenge to this conviction was not moot.
The Court noted the remaining question of whether Mattern had exercised due diligence in timely asserting his challenge to the prior aggravated battery conviction, and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
Gaskin: Death row inmate habeas denied
In Gaskin v. Sec. Dep’t Corrections, No. 06-12351 (Aug. 3, 2007), the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief to a Florida inmate sentenced to death for two 1989 murders.
The Court rejected the claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigation evidence. The Court found that defense counsel made a defensible strategic decision in view of the damaging evidence that would have come out had the defendant’s personal history become an issue.
The Court also rejected Gaskin’s challenge to the failure to grant his change of venue motion, based on pretrial publicity. The Court found that he failed to show the kind of saturated publicity that would allow the Court to presume prejudice.
The Court rejected the claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigation evidence. The Court found that defense counsel made a defensible strategic decision in view of the damaging evidence that would have come out had the defendant’s personal history become an issue.
The Court also rejected Gaskin’s challenge to the failure to grant his change of venue motion, based on pretrial publicity. The Court found that he failed to show the kind of saturated publicity that would allow the Court to presume prejudice.
Vance: Enhancements for Unlawful Travel for Sex with Minor
In U.S. v. Vance, No. 06-13035 (Aug. 3, 2007), the Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of a defendant for attempting to travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor.
The Court found no plain error in the district court’s exclusion, on hearsay grounds, of a defense witness’ statement that the defendant claimed would have been a "prior consistent statement," admissible to counter the government’s claim of recent fabrication. The Court noted defense counsel’s failure to proffer any basis for the statement’s admission at trial, and the district court’s judgment that the statement might have been part of the fabrication.
The Court also affirmed a sentence enhancement for unduly influencing a minor, despite the fact that the only person with whom the defendant communicated was an undercover police officer, not a minor. The Court held that by employing the undercover officer as an intermediary to effectuate his influence, he unduly influenced a minor. The focus is on the defendant’s state of mind, regardless of whether the victim is fictitious.
The Court also affirmed the imposition of an enhancement for use of a computer, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the officer, not him, did the "soliciting." The Court noted that the defendant used a computer to communicate with someone he believed had custody of a minor.
The Court found no plain error in the district court’s exclusion, on hearsay grounds, of a defense witness’ statement that the defendant claimed would have been a "prior consistent statement," admissible to counter the government’s claim of recent fabrication. The Court noted defense counsel’s failure to proffer any basis for the statement’s admission at trial, and the district court’s judgment that the statement might have been part of the fabrication.
The Court also affirmed a sentence enhancement for unduly influencing a minor, despite the fact that the only person with whom the defendant communicated was an undercover police officer, not a minor. The Court held that by employing the undercover officer as an intermediary to effectuate his influence, he unduly influenced a minor. The focus is on the defendant’s state of mind, regardless of whether the victim is fictitious.
The Court also affirmed the imposition of an enhancement for use of a computer, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the officer, not him, did the "soliciting." The Court noted that the defendant used a computer to communicate with someone he believed had custody of a minor.
Ferreira: Habeas Petition Timely Filed after Resentencing
In Ferreira v. Sec. Dept. of Corrections, No. 04-15761 (Aug. 7, 2007), the Court held that Burton v. Stewart, __U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 793 (2007) effectively overruled Rainey v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 443 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2006), and therefore, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, it reinstated as timely Ferreira’s federal habeas petition.
Ferreira filed a federal habeas petition within the one-year statute of limitations after he had been resentenced on a state conviction, but after the expiration of the limitations period after the original judgment of conviction. The Court noted that the Supreme Court in Burton made clear that the limitations provisions of AEDPA are focused on the judgment which holds the petitioner in confinement. Therefore, the statute of limitations period begins to run from the date both the conviction and the sentence the petitioner is serving become final. Hence, Ferreira’s federal habeas petition was timely, because filed within the limitations period that followed his resentencing.
Ferreira filed a federal habeas petition within the one-year statute of limitations after he had been resentenced on a state conviction, but after the expiration of the limitations period after the original judgment of conviction. The Court noted that the Supreme Court in Burton made clear that the limitations provisions of AEDPA are focused on the judgment which holds the petitioner in confinement. Therefore, the statute of limitations period begins to run from the date both the conviction and the sentence the petitioner is serving become final. Hence, Ferreira’s federal habeas petition was timely, because filed within the limitations period that followed his resentencing.
Haun: False Coast Guard Distress Call
In U.S. v. Haun, No. 06-14556 (Aug. 6, 2007), the Court affirmed a conviction for causing the Coast Guard to attempt to save his life, when no help was needed, in violation of 14 U.S.C. § 88(c). The defendant allegedly faked his disappearance while out on a boating trip off of Panama City, Florida. A Coast Guard search for him ensued.
Haun claimed that he did not violate the statute, because a state agency, not Haun himself, nor even the persons on the boat from which he disappeared, placed the distress call to the Coast Guard. Citing the legislative history of the statute, the Court noted that Congress meant to punish not just those who send a false distress message, but also those who, indirectly, by their conduct, cause the Coast Guard to attempt to save life when no help is needed. Here, Haun’s actions were done intentionally, with a bad purpose. He faked his disappearance to avoid a court date, and knew that his disappearance would be reported to authorities.
Haun claimed that he did not violate the statute, because a state agency, not Haun himself, nor even the persons on the boat from which he disappeared, placed the distress call to the Coast Guard. Citing the legislative history of the statute, the Court noted that Congress meant to punish not just those who send a false distress message, but also those who, indirectly, by their conduct, cause the Coast Guard to attempt to save life when no help is needed. Here, Haun’s actions were done intentionally, with a bad purpose. He faked his disappearance to avoid a court date, and knew that his disappearance would be reported to authorities.
Friday, July 27, 2007
Lopez-Vanegas: Drug Trafficking Outside US not Crime in US
In U.S. v. Lopez-Vanegas, No. 05-15021 (July 26, 2007), the Court reversed drug trafficking convictions, finding that mere discussions within the United States related to trafficking controlled substances outside the United States was not a crime.
The Court recognized that in prior cases, courts have given extraterritorial application to 21 U.S.C. § 841 & 846, the drug trafficking offenses. However, in those cases "defendants either possessed or conspired to possess drug substances within the United States, or intended to distribute controlled substances within the United States." Here, the evidence only showed an intent to possess outside the United States, and to distribute outside the United States. Congress showed no intent to criminalize this conduct. Accordingly, the Court vacated the convictions.
The Court recognized that in prior cases, courts have given extraterritorial application to 21 U.S.C. § 841 & 846, the drug trafficking offenses. However, in those cases "defendants either possessed or conspired to possess drug substances within the United States, or intended to distribute controlled substances within the United States." Here, the evidence only showed an intent to possess outside the United States, and to distribute outside the United States. Congress showed no intent to criminalize this conduct. Accordingly, the Court vacated the convictions.
Tampas: YMCA Embezzlement Fraud Conviction Affirmed
In U.S. v. Tampas, No. 06-12051 (July 26, 2007), the Court reversed the restitution order but affirmed the convictions of a defendant convicted of defrauding the Valdosta-Lowndes County, Georgia, YMCA – of which he was President and Executive Director. The scheme involved using YMCA moneys to pay for extensive renovations at Tampas’ home.
The Court rejected a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the convictions, pointing to the handwritten time slips the contractor used in lieu of invoices. The Court also noted that the YMCA Board did not approve the use of the YMCA American Express for Tampas’ personal expenses. The Court also affirmed the conviction for misleading conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), pointing out that Tampas asked an employee to prepare fraudulent spreadsheets to hide the fraudulent work.
The Court rejected Tampas’ indictment "constructive amendment" argument. Tampas claimed that he was convicted for much smaller dollar amounts than those listed in the indictment. The jury instructions did not change the elements of the offenses charged in the indictment, and did not have to specify the exact amounts involved.
The Court also rejected Tampas challenge to the admission, as unduly prejudicial, of evidence that the YMCA had a large amount of unpaid taxes. The Court noted that this evidence was not admitted to prove Tampas’ culpability, and that, in any event, he was aware of the failure to remit taxes.
The Court also rejected challenges to improper prosecutor statements, finding them to have been cured by the court’s instructions. The Court also rejected a challenge to the trial court’s statement "Why can’t the defendant testify about that?," noting that the court offered a curative instruction and that this question had no effect on the jury.
Turning to the sentence, the Court affirmed the obstruction of justice enhancement based on the creation of misleading spreadsheets. The Court also found no error in the loss amount computation in view the district court’s stated intent to impose its sentence under § 3553(a).
For restitution, however, the Court reversed the order which required Tampas to pay YMCA the amount of its unpaid payroll taxes. The Court noted that the government never proved that Tampas’ embezzlement caused the YMCA to fail to pay payroll taxes. The Court noted Tampas preference that the case not be remanded to the district court for resentencing, so that the government could prove other losses to the YMCA, but rejected this request, noting his failure to cite caselaw supporting his "no two bites at the apple" sentencing argument.
The Court rejected a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the convictions, pointing to the handwritten time slips the contractor used in lieu of invoices. The Court also noted that the YMCA Board did not approve the use of the YMCA American Express for Tampas’ personal expenses. The Court also affirmed the conviction for misleading conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), pointing out that Tampas asked an employee to prepare fraudulent spreadsheets to hide the fraudulent work.
The Court rejected Tampas’ indictment "constructive amendment" argument. Tampas claimed that he was convicted for much smaller dollar amounts than those listed in the indictment. The jury instructions did not change the elements of the offenses charged in the indictment, and did not have to specify the exact amounts involved.
The Court also rejected Tampas challenge to the admission, as unduly prejudicial, of evidence that the YMCA had a large amount of unpaid taxes. The Court noted that this evidence was not admitted to prove Tampas’ culpability, and that, in any event, he was aware of the failure to remit taxes.
The Court also rejected challenges to improper prosecutor statements, finding them to have been cured by the court’s instructions. The Court also rejected a challenge to the trial court’s statement "Why can’t the defendant testify about that?," noting that the court offered a curative instruction and that this question had no effect on the jury.
Turning to the sentence, the Court affirmed the obstruction of justice enhancement based on the creation of misleading spreadsheets. The Court also found no error in the loss amount computation in view the district court’s stated intent to impose its sentence under § 3553(a).
For restitution, however, the Court reversed the order which required Tampas to pay YMCA the amount of its unpaid payroll taxes. The Court noted that the government never proved that Tampas’ embezzlement caused the YMCA to fail to pay payroll taxes. The Court noted Tampas preference that the case not be remanded to the district court for resentencing, so that the government could prove other losses to the YMCA, but rejected this request, noting his failure to cite caselaw supporting his "no two bites at the apple" sentencing argument.
Robertson: Lawsuit Settlement not part of Restitution Owed
In U.S. v. Roberston, No. 06-13267 (July 27, 2007), the Court affirmed fraud convictions but reversed a portion of the restitution order.
The defendant purchased software from Novell, a software manufacturer, at discount prices, fraudulently claiming to be an education institution. He then resold the software to a Novell distributor, Network Systems, who itself was not authorized to purchase software from another firm than Novell.
The Court rejected Robertson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, pointing to the circumstantial evidence of fax transmissions.
The Court also affirmed the imposition of a sentence enhancement based on the use of "sophisticated means." The Court pointed to Robertson use of fictional entities to take advantage of discounted prices.
The Court also affirmed a restitution calculation, for payment to Novell, based on the wholesale prices of all the software Robertson purchased, minus the amount Novell obtained in a settlement of a lawsuit against Network Systems arising out of Network Systems’ sales of Robertson-supplied software. The Court noted that Robertson received a benefit when wholesale, not retail, prices were used. The Court also rejected as "baseless" the argument that the software was "unique," not "fungible" goods, for which replacement cost might be the right measure.
The Court, however, agreed with Robertson that he should not have been ordered to pay $125,000 in restitution to Network Systems. This amount represented the amount Network Systems paid Novell to settle a lawsuit brought by Novell against Network Systems for Network Systems’ unauthorized sales of Robertson-bought software. The Court found that too little was known about the nature of the lawsuit for this settlement to be deemed "reasonably foreseeable" to Robertson and thus owed in restitution.
The defendant purchased software from Novell, a software manufacturer, at discount prices, fraudulently claiming to be an education institution. He then resold the software to a Novell distributor, Network Systems, who itself was not authorized to purchase software from another firm than Novell.
The Court rejected Robertson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, pointing to the circumstantial evidence of fax transmissions.
The Court also affirmed the imposition of a sentence enhancement based on the use of "sophisticated means." The Court pointed to Robertson use of fictional entities to take advantage of discounted prices.
The Court also affirmed a restitution calculation, for payment to Novell, based on the wholesale prices of all the software Robertson purchased, minus the amount Novell obtained in a settlement of a lawsuit against Network Systems arising out of Network Systems’ sales of Robertson-supplied software. The Court noted that Robertson received a benefit when wholesale, not retail, prices were used. The Court also rejected as "baseless" the argument that the software was "unique," not "fungible" goods, for which replacement cost might be the right measure.
The Court, however, agreed with Robertson that he should not have been ordered to pay $125,000 in restitution to Network Systems. This amount represented the amount Network Systems paid Novell to settle a lawsuit brought by Novell against Network Systems for Network Systems’ unauthorized sales of Robertson-bought software. The Court found that too little was known about the nature of the lawsuit for this settlement to be deemed "reasonably foreseeable" to Robertson and thus owed in restitution.
Wednesday, July 25, 2007
Gore: Waiver of Miranda effective upon resumption of questioning
In Gore v. Sec. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 06-11522 (July 20, 2007), the Court denied habeas relief to a Florida death row inmate convicted of a 1988 murder.
Gore was first questioned by federal officials. This questioning ceased once he invoked his right to remain silent. Seven days later, questioning resumed by state officials, and Gore waived his Miranda rights. Seven hours of questioning ensued. Gore made incriminating statements during this questioning, which he then sought to suppress at trial. The Florida courts held that the statements were not obtained in violation of his rights.
On federal habeas review, the Court noted that AEDPA required it to defer to the Florida court’s determination unless it was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court caselaw. Here, Gore waived his right to silence and right to counsel before the second questioning occurred. The Court deferred to the Florida Supreme Court’s credibility determination which credited the testimony of the Florida officer who testified that Gore had not invoked his right to counsel. Further, the mere fact that counsel had been appointed in an unrelated case was not a "constructive invocation" of the right to counsel. The Court noted that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was "offense-specific."
Gore was first questioned by federal officials. This questioning ceased once he invoked his right to remain silent. Seven days later, questioning resumed by state officials, and Gore waived his Miranda rights. Seven hours of questioning ensued. Gore made incriminating statements during this questioning, which he then sought to suppress at trial. The Florida courts held that the statements were not obtained in violation of his rights.
On federal habeas review, the Court noted that AEDPA required it to defer to the Florida court’s determination unless it was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court caselaw. Here, Gore waived his right to silence and right to counsel before the second questioning occurred. The Court deferred to the Florida Supreme Court’s credibility determination which credited the testimony of the Florida officer who testified that Gore had not invoked his right to counsel. Further, the mere fact that counsel had been appointed in an unrelated case was not a "constructive invocation" of the right to counsel. The Court noted that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was "offense-specific."
Tuesday, July 24, 2007
Ciszkowski: Silencer did not manipulate sentence
In U.S. v. Ciszkowski, No. 06-12592 (July 20, 2007), the Court affirmed the convictions and sentence of a defendant convicted of murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958 and possession of a firearm with silencer in furtherance of a crime of violence and drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B)(ii). The murder for hire offense carried a ten-year maximum; the silencer count carried a 30-year mandatory minimum. The trial court
The Court rejected the argument that the jury should have been instructed that, for the silencer count, it had to find that the defendant had knowledge of the silencer. The Court found that this was not an element of the offense, but a sentencing factor. The Court noted that someone who violated § 924(c) had already demonstrated a "vicious will," and that there was no risk of punishing an innocent actor by applying the silencer enhancement. Further, the silencer only increased the statutory minimum, not the statutory maximum, for a § 924(c) violation.
The Court also rejected Ciszkowski’s "sentencing manipulation" challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence. The defendant claimed that he had never seen the silencer that was hidden in the suitcase that was given to him by a government informant as part of the sting murder for hire. He claimed that the silencer had been put in the suitcase only to increase the mandatory minimum to 30 years. The Court recognized that "if the government provided a undetectably silenced weapon in a circumstance where the firearm or the silencer was completely unrelated to the accompanying criminal act, we might be inclined to find improper sentencing manipulation in such a case." Here, however, because the silencer was to be used for a murder for hire, a muzzled firearm was an appropriate weapon for the government to provide.
The Court rejected the argument that the jury should have been instructed that, for the silencer count, it had to find that the defendant had knowledge of the silencer. The Court found that this was not an element of the offense, but a sentencing factor. The Court noted that someone who violated § 924(c) had already demonstrated a "vicious will," and that there was no risk of punishing an innocent actor by applying the silencer enhancement. Further, the silencer only increased the statutory minimum, not the statutory maximum, for a § 924(c) violation.
The Court also rejected Ciszkowski’s "sentencing manipulation" challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence. The defendant claimed that he had never seen the silencer that was hidden in the suitcase that was given to him by a government informant as part of the sting murder for hire. He claimed that the silencer had been put in the suitcase only to increase the mandatory minimum to 30 years. The Court recognized that "if the government provided a undetectably silenced weapon in a circumstance where the firearm or the silencer was completely unrelated to the accompanying criminal act, we might be inclined to find improper sentencing manipulation in such a case." Here, however, because the silencer was to be used for a murder for hire, a muzzled firearm was an appropriate weapon for the government to provide.
Tuesday, July 17, 2007
Campbell: Atlanta mayor not entitled to representation by convicted accomplice's counsel
In Campbell v. U.S., No. 06-13548 (July 13, 2007), the Court affirmed the conviction and 30-month sentence of a former mayor of Atlanta, Ga., convicted of tax fraud (though acquitted of all RICO and bribery charges).
The Court rejected the argument that, in violation of his right to counsel, Campbell was deprived of counsel of his choice when the trial court ruled that he could not be represented by a law partner of the lawyer who represented one of Campbell’s accomplices against criminal charges arising from the same corruption scheme. The Court noted that this accomplice refused to waive the attorney-client privilege. By disqualifying Campbell’s counsel of choice – to whom conflict was imputed by reason of his relationship to his law partner – the trial court legitimately preserved the fairness of the trial.
The Court also rejected Campbell’s challenge to his sentence, expressing surprise that Campbell believed he had been sentenced harshly when in reality the sentence reflected the district court’s decision, of "considerable leniency and restraint," to run concurrently sentences for separate counts of conviction. The Count found no undue reliance on acquitted conduct, pointing out that the sentence was within the limit authorized by the jury’s verdict. The Court also upheld the enhancement for using "sophisticated means," pointing out that Campbell hid his illegal moneys through use of "fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial accounts."
The Court also rejected a challenge to an obstruction of justice enhancement, finding no basis to overturn the district court’s credibility finding on this point.
Finally, the Court rejected Campbell’s "unreasonableness" challenge to his sentence. The Court pointed out that the 30-month sentence was far less than the statutory maximum for the sentence for which he was convicted, and even less close to the maximum for the statutes with which he was charged but acquitted. Therefore the sentence was not unreasonable, and did not reflect punishment for the acquitted counts.
The Court rejected the argument that, in violation of his right to counsel, Campbell was deprived of counsel of his choice when the trial court ruled that he could not be represented by a law partner of the lawyer who represented one of Campbell’s accomplices against criminal charges arising from the same corruption scheme. The Court noted that this accomplice refused to waive the attorney-client privilege. By disqualifying Campbell’s counsel of choice – to whom conflict was imputed by reason of his relationship to his law partner – the trial court legitimately preserved the fairness of the trial.
The Court also rejected Campbell’s challenge to his sentence, expressing surprise that Campbell believed he had been sentenced harshly when in reality the sentence reflected the district court’s decision, of "considerable leniency and restraint," to run concurrently sentences for separate counts of conviction. The Count found no undue reliance on acquitted conduct, pointing out that the sentence was within the limit authorized by the jury’s verdict. The Court also upheld the enhancement for using "sophisticated means," pointing out that Campbell hid his illegal moneys through use of "fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial accounts."
The Court also rejected a challenge to an obstruction of justice enhancement, finding no basis to overturn the district court’s credibility finding on this point.
Finally, the Court rejected Campbell’s "unreasonableness" challenge to his sentence. The Court pointed out that the 30-month sentence was far less than the statutory maximum for the sentence for which he was convicted, and even less close to the maximum for the statutes with which he was charged but acquitted. Therefore the sentence was not unreasonable, and did not reflect punishment for the acquitted counts.
Herring: Good Faith Exception applies to mistake in records of another county
In U.S. v. Herring, No. 06-10795 (July 17, 2007), the Court held that when officers in one jurisdiction check with employees of a law enforcement agency in another jurisdiction, and are – mistakenly, it turns out – told that there is an outstanding warrant for an individual, and the officers arrest the person, and a search yields contraband, the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the evidence, because of the "good faith exception" of U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The mistake occurred because the agency in the other jurisdiction had failed to note in its records that the warrant had been recalled.
The Court rejected the government’s argument that the case was governed by Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995), where the good faith exception applied to a mistake by a court employee. Here the mistake was made by a law enforcement officer, and Evans did not reach such circumstances.
The Court, however, found that the policies recognized in Leon would be better served by not applying the exclusionary rule. First, the deterrent benefits of excluding the evidence would not be present. The person who mistakenly failed to record that Herring’s warrant had been recalled was "negligent." "Deterrents work best where the targeted conduct results from conscious decision making, because only if the decision maker considers the possible results of her actions can she be deterred." In addition, law enforcement agencies have inherent reasons to keep good records, which need not be supplemented by exclusionary rules. Further, no deterrent effect would be served, because officers in one jurisdiction have little concern about the prospect of frustrating prosecutions in another jurisdiction.
The Court noted that if faulty record-keeping became endemic in a particular county, officers in another county might have a "difficult time" establishing that their reliance on this county’s records was objectively reasonable.
The Court rejected the government’s argument that the case was governed by Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995), where the good faith exception applied to a mistake by a court employee. Here the mistake was made by a law enforcement officer, and Evans did not reach such circumstances.
The Court, however, found that the policies recognized in Leon would be better served by not applying the exclusionary rule. First, the deterrent benefits of excluding the evidence would not be present. The person who mistakenly failed to record that Herring’s warrant had been recalled was "negligent." "Deterrents work best where the targeted conduct results from conscious decision making, because only if the decision maker considers the possible results of her actions can she be deterred." In addition, law enforcement agencies have inherent reasons to keep good records, which need not be supplemented by exclusionary rules. Further, no deterrent effect would be served, because officers in one jurisdiction have little concern about the prospect of frustrating prosecutions in another jurisdiction.
The Court noted that if faulty record-keeping became endemic in a particular county, officers in another county might have a "difficult time" establishing that their reliance on this county’s records was objectively reasonable.
Lewis: Olano is good law in the 11th Circuit
In U.S. v. Lewis, No. 06-11876 (July 17, 2006), the Court (en banc), in order to brings its Circuit caselaw in conformity with the 14-year old Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), held that, for error preservation on appeal, a "waiver" is an intentional reliquishment of a known right, whereas the simple failure to assert a right, without any affirmative steps to voluntarily waive it, is a "forfeiture." A waiver abandons the right to appellate review; forfeiture is reviewable under the plain error standard of Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
Turning to whether plain error occurred, the Court found no error at all. Lewis claimed that a Double Jeopardy violation occurred when, after he pled guilty to some counts of the indictment, the prosecution subjected him to a trial on a remaining count to which he had not pled guilty – and for which one count to which he had pled guilty was a lesser-included offense. Double Jeopardy protects only against successive prosecutions, not simultaneous ones. Thus, the trial of Lewis for an offense that was part of the same indictment as the charges to which he pled guilty did not violate Double Jeopardy.
Turning to whether plain error occurred, the Court found no error at all. Lewis claimed that a Double Jeopardy violation occurred when, after he pled guilty to some counts of the indictment, the prosecution subjected him to a trial on a remaining count to which he had not pled guilty – and for which one count to which he had pled guilty was a lesser-included offense. Double Jeopardy protects only against successive prosecutions, not simultaneous ones. Thus, the trial of Lewis for an offense that was part of the same indictment as the charges to which he pled guilty did not violate Double Jeopardy.
Tuesday, July 10, 2007
Walker: Batson violation remedy may be juror reinstatement
In U.S. v. Walker, No. 05-16756 (July 6, 2007), the Court affirmed convictions and sentences arising out of the prosecution of a Georgia state legislator for mail fraud.
The Court rejected the argument that the district court abused its discretion when, after the defendant exercised his peremptory challenges to eliminate four white male jurors from the venire, it granted the government’s Batson challenge, and reinstated the jurors to the jury pool. Though "somewhat troubled" by the district court’s finding that the defendant’s rationale for the strikes were "pretextual," in view of its different treatment of similarly-rationalized strikes, the court deferred to the district court’s finding of lack of genuineness, and likelihood of purposeful discrimination. The Court also deferred to the district court’s reinstatement remedy, noting the broad discretion as to the choice of remedy, and the "defensible approach" the district court took here.
The Court rejected a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the mail fraud convictions. The Court noted that the honest services mail fraud statute is "extremely broad." Here, the evidence showed a scheme by Walker to enrich himself by using his legislative position as a bargaining tool to secure additional business for one of the businesses he owned. Walker’s own communications showed his belief that he was entitled to additional business in exchange for legislative assistance (even though, in reality, he influenced no actual legislation).
The Court also rejected Walker’s federalism arguments that a prosecution predicated on a non-criminal ethics provision – which required disclosure of business relationships - is unconstitutional, since only the state is entitled to criminalize such conduct. The Court noted that the jury was specifically instructed not to ground its verdict on state law. The jury’s verdict could have been unrelated to any state ethics requirement, but based only on a federal honest services mail fraud violation.
Turning to sentencing, the Court rejected a double counting challenge based on cumulative enhancements for abuse of trust and for a misrepresentation on behalf of a charity. The Court found that these enhancements involved different harms, to the charity, and to the charity’s donors. The Court also affirmed the supervisory role enhancement, albeit on different grounds than those stated by the district court.
The Court rejected the argument that the district court abused its discretion when, after the defendant exercised his peremptory challenges to eliminate four white male jurors from the venire, it granted the government’s Batson challenge, and reinstated the jurors to the jury pool. Though "somewhat troubled" by the district court’s finding that the defendant’s rationale for the strikes were "pretextual," in view of its different treatment of similarly-rationalized strikes, the court deferred to the district court’s finding of lack of genuineness, and likelihood of purposeful discrimination. The Court also deferred to the district court’s reinstatement remedy, noting the broad discretion as to the choice of remedy, and the "defensible approach" the district court took here.
The Court rejected a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the mail fraud convictions. The Court noted that the honest services mail fraud statute is "extremely broad." Here, the evidence showed a scheme by Walker to enrich himself by using his legislative position as a bargaining tool to secure additional business for one of the businesses he owned. Walker’s own communications showed his belief that he was entitled to additional business in exchange for legislative assistance (even though, in reality, he influenced no actual legislation).
The Court also rejected Walker’s federalism arguments that a prosecution predicated on a non-criminal ethics provision – which required disclosure of business relationships - is unconstitutional, since only the state is entitled to criminalize such conduct. The Court noted that the jury was specifically instructed not to ground its verdict on state law. The jury’s verdict could have been unrelated to any state ethics requirement, but based only on a federal honest services mail fraud violation.
Turning to sentencing, the Court rejected a double counting challenge based on cumulative enhancements for abuse of trust and for a misrepresentation on behalf of a charity. The Court found that these enhancements involved different harms, to the charity, and to the charity’s donors. The Court also affirmed the supervisory role enhancement, albeit on different grounds than those stated by the district court.
Monday, July 09, 2007
Lozano: U.S. value ok for Latin American counterfeits
In U.S. v. Lozano, No. 06-11136 (July 9, 2007), the Court affirmed the sentences of defendants convicted of conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit goods in violation 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2320(a).
At sentencing, the defendants contested the attribution of the loss amount, claiming that the correct loss computation should have reflected the value of the counterfeit items in the market in which those goods were sold, Latin America, not the retail price in the United States. The sentencing court stated that even if the loss calculation were erroneous, it would still have imposed the same 72-month sentence using its discretion under § 3553(a).
The Court found that the use of the value in the United States was not clearly erroneous.
The Court added that the sentence would still have been reasonable even if the calculation were erroneous because the variance above the otherwise applicable 21-27 month range was not unreasonable, in view of the "expansive, expensive, and extensive" nature of defendants’ scheme.
At sentencing, the defendants contested the attribution of the loss amount, claiming that the correct loss computation should have reflected the value of the counterfeit items in the market in which those goods were sold, Latin America, not the retail price in the United States. The sentencing court stated that even if the loss calculation were erroneous, it would still have imposed the same 72-month sentence using its discretion under § 3553(a).
The Court found that the use of the value in the United States was not clearly erroneous.
The Court added that the sentence would still have been reasonable even if the calculation were erroneous because the variance above the otherwise applicable 21-27 month range was not unreasonable, in view of the "expansive, expensive, and extensive" nature of defendants’ scheme.
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