In U.S. v. Lewis, No. 10-13567 (March 23, 2012) (2-1) (Wilson, J., dissenting), on a government appeal of a district court granting a motion to suppress, the Court reversed, finding no Fourth Amendment violation.
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/201013567.pdf
Orange County, Florida police officers entered the parking lot of a restaurant, in a high crime area. They observed four males standing in between two parked vehicles, "just hanging out." The officers approached the men and asked whether any of them were carrying guns. Two of the men responded affirmatively, one saying that a firearm was on his person, and another stating that a firearm was in a backpack in the trunk of the nearby vehicle. Two others (including the defendant Lewis) said nothing. The officers immediately drew their weapons and ordered all four men to sit down on the ground and show their hands. Lewis walked a few steps away from the other men. Lewis was ordered to slide over to the other three men. He complied. Lewis looked "extremely nervous." The officers examined the ground where Lewis was previously seated and saw a semi-automatic pistol underneath a vehicle. Lewis was charged with unlawful possession of this firearm.
The Court found that based on one of the four men’s admission that he was carrying a handgun, the officers had reasonable suspicion that this person was committing a crime under Florida law: carrying a concealed weapon. The Court found that it was reasonable under the circumstances to detain Lewis. The officers faced substantial, immediate danger when confronted with the known possession of the two firearms. The officers "were entitled to control the scene and exercise command over the situation."
Dissenting, Judge Wilson stated that the circumstances permitted a pat down for weapons of those suspected of criminal activity, but there were no "specific and articulable facts" that would give rise to the inference that Lewis was engaged in criminal activity.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals - Published Opinions
Friday, March 23, 2012
Tuesday, March 20, 2012
Romo-Villalobos: Resisting officer is "crime of violence"
In United States v. Romo-Villalobos, No. 10-15350 (March 20, 2012), the Court affirmed the 37-month sentence of a defendant convicted of illegal reentry after a felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1), and for illegal reentry after conviction of false representations, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(1) and 1329.
The Court rejected the argument that the 16-level Guideline enhancement for a reentry offender with a conviction for a prior "crime of violence" should not have applied. The Court pointed out that Florida courts interpreted Romo-Villalobos’ prior offense for obstructing a police officer as one in which violence was a necessary element of the offense. The Court rejected the argument that Florida caselaw showed that de minimis force is sufficient to establish violence under Romo-Villalobos’ Florida offense of conviction.
The Court rejected the argument that the 16-level Guideline enhancement for a reentry offender with a conviction for a prior "crime of violence" should not have applied. The Court pointed out that Florida courts interpreted Romo-Villalobos’ prior offense for obstructing a police officer as one in which violence was a necessary element of the offense. The Court rejected the argument that Florida caselaw showed that de minimis force is sufficient to establish violence under Romo-Villalobos’ Florida offense of conviction.
Tuesday, March 06, 2012
Rozzelle: Actual Innocence means more than guilt of lesser offense
In Rozzelle v. Sec. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 10-13595 (Feb. 29, 2012), the Court held that a habeas petitioner’s claim that he was guilty only of manslaughter, but not second-degree murder, did not constitute an "actual innocence" claim for purposes of creating a "gateway" to relief for a petition that is time-barred under the statute of limitations of the AEDPA. Actual innocence does not narrowly slice "the various degrees of wrongdoing."
In addition, the Court found that Rozzelle’s proof of actual innocence fell short of establishing actual innocence, because the jury heard virtually the same evidence as the new evidence Rozzelle now presented.
In addition, the Court found that Rozzelle’s proof of actual innocence fell short of establishing actual innocence, because the jury heard virtually the same evidence as the new evidence Rozzelle now presented.
Rozzelle: Actual Innocence means more than guilt of lesser offense
In Rozzelle v. Sec. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 10-13595 (Feb. 29, 2012), the Court held that a habeas petitioner’s claim that he was guilty only of manslaughter, but not second-degree murder, did not constitute an "actual innocence" claim for purposes of creating a "gateway" to relief for a petition that is time-barred under the statute of limitations of the AEDPA. Actual innocence does not narrowly slice "the various degrees of wrongdoing."
In addition, the Court found that Rozzelle’s proof of actual innocence fell short of establishing actual innocence, because the jury heard virtually the same evidence as the new evidence Rozzelle now presented.
In addition, the Court found that Rozzelle’s proof of actual innocence fell short of establishing actual innocence, because the jury heard virtually the same evidence as the new evidence Rozzelle now presented.
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